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“To Make A Garden Spot of One of the Dreariest Places on the Planet”: Federal 
Reclamation on the Zuni and Navajo Reservations, 1883-1914 (121 pp.)
Director: Dan L. Flores
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the power of irrigation to redeem 
the arid portions o f the American West and make it habitable and productive country 
became akin to gospel. As the gospel of irrigation caught on, the Indian Service began to 
see the possibilities that reclamation held for not only redeeming barren land, but for 
modernizing Indians. The Navajo and Zuni Indians were two of the first peoples to be 
subject to the Indian Service's plans to turn the desert into a garden. Between 1883 and 
1914 the Indian Service tried time and again to make irrigation work. In the last fifteen 
years of the nineteenth century efforts at irrigation were amateurish, ad hoc affairs. But 
after the turn of the century, the Indian Service got serious. The Blackrock dam on the 
Zuni reservation came to dominate irrigation efforts in the Southwest: The fifteen years 
on either side of the new century were markedly different. Drought plagued the 
Southwest in the late nineteenth century, and wet years characterized the first decade and 
a half of the twentieth. The change in the climate paralleled perfectly the change 0‘om 
amateurism to professionalism in the Indian Service's irrigation efforts. Drought lulled 
the Indian Service into thinking that it could control Southwestern streams. But the 
increase in rainfall and streamflow in the twentieth century saw to it that their 
waterworks projects continually were damaged. I explore the change in policy from 
small projects to large ones and the effect the change in the climate had on those projects 
and Indian Service policy.
As important as tlie change in the weather was to rendering the waterworks projects 
useless was Indian resistance. Each year was marked by cycles of ritual, as well as 
hunting and agricultural regimes. The Navajo and Zuni allegiance to their annudl cycles, 
when combined with the change in the weather, saw to it that the projects would never be 
successful. Adequate Zuni and Navajo labor could never be secured. Indian agency in 
determining their own history is a major feature of the thesis. The Indian Service failed 
to take into account both the environment and Indians in designing their agricultural 
utopia. Both saw to it that their plans were unsuccessful.
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Reclamation and Redemption: Indians, the Indian Service, and the Gospel of
Irrigation
Each year as the snow in the mountains of the Colorado Plateau melts, donnant 
arroyos and tiny washes awake from hibernation and for a short time they water the 
desert floor. Again in the summer, when the monsoon season hits the country, after a 
brief rest, these same stream beds are called to action. The combined power o f wind and 
water forms the region’s unique topography.' Bift the floods that wash over northern 
Arizona and New Mexico each year have eroded and reshaped more than the physical 
landscape. They washed away great plans to transform the desert into a garden.
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian policy, in part, was patterned 
around turning Indians into self supporting communities. Virtually all the western Indian 
peoples endured the same process; sedentary farming would end what appeared to be 
nomadic ways, and, along with the Dawes Allotment Act, free up valuable land for white 
settlers. Indians would come to value private property and embrace the market economy, 
too.^ But across the West, one last act o f benevolent paternalism was necessary: the 
construction of irrigation projects. In 1898, N.S. Walpole, the agent for the Pueblo and 
Jicarilla Agency in New Mexico, optimistically declared that a dam on the Zuni
* For the boundaries o f  the Southwest and geologic history see Donald Baars, Navajo Country: A Geology 
and Natural History o f the Four Comers Region (Albuquerque; Univ. o f  N ew  M exico Press, 1995); for a 
lengthy discussion o f  the boundaries o f  the Southwest, see James W. Byrkit, “Land, Sky, and People: The 
Southwest Defined,” Journal o f the Southwest 34 (1992): 257-387, see especially 283-301
* David Rich Lewis, “Agriculture, Civilization, and American Indian Policy,” in Neither Wolf, Nor Dog: 
American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change (N ew  York. Oxford Univ. Press, 1994); R. 
Douglas Hurt, “From Civû War to  Severalty” and “The White Man’s Road,” in Indian Agriculture in 
America: From Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: The Univ. Press o f  Kansas, 1987); Donald J. Pisani, 
Chapter 8, “Case Studies in National Water Policy: The Yakima and the Pima,” in Nationalizing the Waters
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reservation would forever obviate the need for Government assistance and “they would 
have thousands of bushels of grain for market and thus live decently Walpole’s 
enthusiasm was echoed across other reservations; Irrigation projects would redeem 
Indians and make them better prepared for the rigors of the twentieth century.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Indian Service crisscrossed 
the Southwest designing irrigation projects for needy Indians.^ Largely spawned by 
benevolent intents, the projects were nevertheless plagued by a variety of problems. In 
the three and a half decades I will examine, the Indian Service attempted to build several 
projects for the Navajo and Zuni Indians. On the Navajo reservation, the Indian Service 
planned both large and small waterworks projects; at Zuni, one major dam was to suffice 
for all of their water needs.
The history of irrigation development on the Colorado Plateau between 1880- 
1915 falls into two distinct phases. They break at roughly the turn of the century. In the 
first phase, Indian Agents were just beginning to get to know the country. In fact, the 
Pueblo Agent administered the Zunis; they did not have their own Agent until 1902. 
Indian Agents—many of whom in the nineteenth century were patronage appointments— 
had little or no experience with anything resembling engineering, much less Indians, but 
they tried their hand at reclaiming Southwestern waterways for the benefit of Indian 
peoples. The Agents were naïve, but generally had good intentions. Too, an almost
(forthcoming); Thomas R. Wessel, “Agriculture, Indians, and American History Agricultural History 50 
(1976): 9-20; the Zuni, Navajo, and Pueblo lands were not allotted under the Dawes Act.
 ̂N .S. Walpole to Comm, o f  Indian Affairs (CIA), 22 November 1898, Special Case 190-Irrigation (SC  
190), Box 212, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D  C. (NA). I will cite the letter 
number when one is provided.
“ There were irrigation projects attempted all over the Southwest, not only on the Colorado Plateau.
Indeed, all over the West, the Indian Service worked to reclaim river and streams for Indians.
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biannual turnover of Agents made it tough for any one Agent to get to know the country. 
As each Agent cycled through the reservations he would have to learn anew the 
exigencies of desert living/
From the first, reclaiming water was associated with redeeming Indians. A 
permanent water supply would finally plant the Navajo, for example, in one place. 
Because white settlers were moving into the region, Navajos could not continue to 
wander the country in search of water. At Zuni, Agents found sedentary agriculturists. 
They had settled along the Zuni River and near several springs, but were not using the 
water to its full potential. If they could manage to put more land under cultivation 
possibly they could grow a surplus and have enough to sell at market. At the very least, 
growing more food would lift them out of their apparently destitute condition.
Putting Indians to work was another benefit of building waterworks on the 
reservations. Teaching Indians the value of work was, to be sure, no less a goal than 
reclamation. Indeed, the leading conservation journal of the day. Forestry and 
Irrigation, took this position. In 1903, an anonymous author wrote.
While the object is to give the Indian productive farming land, it has been the 
custom, with very few exceptions, to employ him in every way possible on the work. 
The idea is to give him manual training, to teach him to build and care for a ditch, to 
create a market for his labor, and make him work for a daily wage, even though he be 
paid to work for his own advantage. ^
When the Indian Service tried to manage water, they also tried to change Indians 
into citizens of the modem world through work. Their goals were twofold: transform
 ̂ Ruth Underhill found that between 1869 and 1902 there were fifteen different agents on the Navajo 
Reservation, giving them little time to understand the yearly cycle o f  floods, or much else, for that matter. 
Ruth Underhill, tJie Navajo {lincoixi. Univ. o f  Nebraska Press, 1956), 169
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waterways into tools of more efficient production and change Indians into workers, and 
thus model participants in the twentieth century. That is, by reclaiming rivers and 
streams they sought to redeem Indians; by putting the rivers to work they would put 
Indians to work. The dam at Zuni employed almost exclusively Indian workers and was 
thought of as an ideal way to train local Indians—^Navajos, Apaches, and Pueblos, as well 
as Zunis—the value of a hard day’s work. The documents are rife with the rhetoric of 
redemption. These were the modest designs of the Indian Service.
In this first phase Agents had little or no idea what they were doing. Harnessing 
the power of southwestern streams proved more troublesome than they had envisioned. 
Part of the urgency that the Agents felt was brought on by the extreme aridity of the 
Colorado Plateau. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a millennial drought 
desiccated the Southwest.^ Naturally enough, agents took the drought for normal 
conditions. And because they could not imagine any other weather scenario they worked 
furiously to compensate for the drought by building waterworks for the Indians. That 
Indian Agents with little or no experience in the desert misread the landscape and made 
mistakes should come as no surprise.
But nature in the Southwest was a merciless foe for the Indian Service. When the 
nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the cycle of drought that withered the 
Southwest for two decades—and left behind immense gullies and a thirsty desert—was 
replaced by a series of wet years—the beginning of the second phase of irrigation 
development. This climatic pulse coincided with the Indian Service’s plans to move from
 ̂Anonymous, “The American Indian and Irrigation,” Forestry’ and Irrigation 9 (1903): 233, Francis E, 
Leupp, The Indian and His Problem York Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910), 157-158.
 ̂ See note 9, especially Schulman.
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small reclamation projects designed to reclaim ephemeral streams and move to grand 
waterworks on the Colorado Plateau.* Heavy and destructive flooding became common 
after 1902, when more regular rain started to fall on the region. And in 1905 New 
Mexico experienced its wettest year to date.^ The drought fueled the fire of reclamation, 
and the floods of the first decade of the new century doused it.
The two phases of irrigation development are broken by this sudden climate shift. 
The level of optimism that peppers the documents in the nineteenth century is 
remarkable indeed. But by the time that major rains began to return to the Colorado 
Plateau, and the march of the twentieth century was well underway, attitudes, and 
circumstances, had changed. Optimistic naïveté marked late nineteenth century designs, 
while professional, bureaucratic concerns drove efforts in the early twentieth.
The increase in rainfall and flood severity was not the only factor that kept 
irrigation projects from succeeding in the region. John B. Harper, eventually in charge of 
most waterworks projects on the Colorado Plateau, was obsessed with the massive 
Blackrock Dam on the Zuni reservation. In his single-minded focus to finish the dam he 
neglected damage done to other projects that were also affected by the severe flooding. 
Harper’s and the Indian Service’s development at Zuni led to the underdevelopment
* The Hopi, Jicarilla Apache, Utes, Pueblos and many more also had irrigation works planned and, in some 
cases built, for their respective reservations.
 ̂For the climate changes and the Navajo see Underhill, 167; Richard White, The Roots o f  Dependency: 
Environment. Subsistence, and Social Change Among the Navajo, Choctaw and Pawnee (Lincoln; Univ. o f  
Nebraska Press, 1983), 215-227; For N ew  Mexico and regional climate change in general see Yi-Fu Tuan 
and Cyril E. Everhard, “N ew M exico’s Climate; The Appreciation o f  a Resource,” Natural Resources 
Journal 4 (1964); 269-308 and Tuan, “N ew  Mexican Gullies; A Critical Review and Some Recent 
Interpretations,” Annals o f  the Association o f  American Geographers 56 (1966): 573-597; A1 Richmond 
and William R Baron, “Precipitation, Range Carrying Capacity, and Navajo Livestock Raising, 1870-1976,” 
Agricultural History 63(1989); 217-230, 227; for the drought see especially Edmund Schulman, Tree Ring 
Hydrology o f  the Colorado River Basin, Laboratory o f  Tree Ring Research, Bulletin N o 2, (Tucson; Univ. 
o f  Arizona Press, 1945), 45-46; Albert J. Richmond, “Historical Precipitation Sequences o f  the Colorado 
Plateau, 1859-1983,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis (Flagstaff; Northern Arizona Univ., 1987)
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elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tenacity of the Indian peoples 
regarding their ceremonial and agricultural schedules kept projects from progressing at a 
pace that would satisfy the engineers. Throughout the year various exigencies of the 
Indians’ lives brought work to a standstill. The construction of the Blackrock Dam, for 
example, ground to a halt each year as the Zunis prepared for Shalako, the winter solstice 
ceremony. Harper was forced to accommodate all of the various ceremonial, hunting, 
and planting schedules of the Indians he employed. While the Irrigation Division hoped 
for a cheap and docile labor force, what they got were discrete cultural groups operating 
on somewhat related, but distinctly different, annual schedules. Thus, irrigation projects 
on the Colorado Plateau were largely at the mercy of the combined forces of nature and 
Indian cultural vigor, and, to a lesser extent, John B Harper’s relentless pursuit to finish 
the Blackrock Dam.
In general, then, the focus of the thesis will be to track the history of irrigation 
efforts on the Navajo and Zuni reservations between 1880-1915. The dates are not 
chosen arbitrarily. No concerted effort was made by the government until the early 
1880s to reclaim water on Indian land on the Colorado Plateau. The final date marks a 
turn away from large annual expenditures on projects on Indian reservation as the country 
geared up for World War I. Also, after 1915 the weather took another turn. But within 
that time frame there are some specific issues that I would like to explore. I have chosen 
to use climate as framing device because the weather so profoundly affected the history 
of these projects. During the drought, the climate seemed to dictate one kind of 
behavior; after the turn of the century, and the return of regular rainfall, another course of 
action was necessary.
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As Indian Agents got to know both the country and the Indians during the drought 
they made a host of assumptions regarding Indian life. Navajos were strictly nomads— 
the Free Riders of the Plains, as one Agent called them; the Zuni never strayed from their 
villages. Zunis were harmless, peace loving people, “docile and ignorant,” waiting to be 
redeemed by the Indian Service. On the other hand, the Navajo were “wild Indians” in 
need of discipline. But all o f them were found wanting. If a permanent water supply 
could be secured, the Indians would have all they needed. As I have said, the Navajo 
would then settle in villages and the Zuni would pull themselves out of poverty. 
Frederick Hoxie characterized the last twenty years of the nineteenth century as a period 
of reform, a time to assimilate Indians into the white mainstream. Indians could be 
remade in the white man’s image in short order through fundamental changes. Agents 
would lead by example and Indians would follow; they were merely at an inchoate stage 
of development. In the case of the Navajo, for example, if they would end their nomadic 
ways, the energy they put into wandering the country with their sheep could be focused 
on building villages and raising crops and selling wool at market. But the Indian Service 
first had to prove it to them. The reform impulse Hoxie identifies fairly assesses the 
situation on the Colorado Plateau in this time period. Agents were frequently frustrated 
by Indian ways, but they remained optimistic about the eventual success of their reform 
efforts.
Optimism was not enough, however. Even during conditions of drought the 
Indian Service underestimated the power of water. Too, they did not understand that 
Indian life ways could not be changed in a generation. Older ways of knowing nature, of 
managing water, could not be supplanted by dams and rationally ordered agricultural
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
designs. The Indian Service made plans based on the presumed docility of Indians and 
the malleability of water. The last twenty years of the century were a period of 
reconnaissance marked by small reclamation projects and trial and error. It was a time of 
learning for the Indian Service. The impressions of Indians that I mentioned above were 
formed as Agents began to filter out amongst the reservations. As they did so they 
gathered information on where reclamation projects could be situated The Indians 
Service planned no big projects during this time. But the drought that marked the last 
twenty years of the century impressed upon the Agents just how precious water was on 
the Colorado Plateau.
The initial focus, then, is this period of reconnaissance. As agents fanned out 
across the country in these years they gathered the baseline information regarding how 
they would proceed with reclamation projects. This period is one marked by optimism 
and naïveté based on scant experience on the Colorado Plateau. The Indian Service 
employed few professional engineers during the nineteenth century. The projects that 
they did undertake can be safely characterized as failures. But to ascribe this to 
malicious intent or some sort of malfeasance on the part of the Indian Service would be 
wrong. Rather, the men who filled the position of Agent had good intentions; what they 
lacked was any conception of how to reclaim the desert. And the drought that desiccated 
the Colorado Plateau only made their mission seem that much more important.
This first part of the thesis, the reconnaissance phase, will be, essentially, a 
narrative. I intend to set the stage for events that took place during the first fifteen years 
of the twentieth century. To understand the twentieth century it is imperative to have a 
clear picture of what went on in the nineteenth. All the impressions of the Indians on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Colorado Plateau were made in the last twenty years of the nineteenth—in regards to 
their water needs—and information regarding the physical environment was gathered, 
too Thus, when work began in earnest during the early years of the twentieth century, 
the Indian Service was operating on information gathered in the first phase of irrigation 
history. And as circumstances changed, that information quickly became worthless. For 
example, making judgments about where to build dams based on stream flow collected 
during the 1890s was useless during the high flood periods of the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Assumptions concerning the docility of the Indian labor force were 
also rendered void. Indians would not compromise their ceremonial lives to become day 
laborers. When the Indian Service decided to build major waterworks projects on the 
Colorado Plateau they found that much of what they learned in the late nineteenth 
century did not apply to the changed conditions of the early twentieth.
It is essential to describe just what the Indian Service did find. As well, in order 
to contrast it with the twentieth century, emphasis will be placed on the amateurish, ad 
hoc way of proceeding with reclamation. The Indian Service designed these projects as 
cultural and environmental engineering. They were built to control both people and the 
environment in such a way that the Indian Service could then turn its back on both. That 
is, the Indian Service wanted to create self sustaining communities on the Colorado 
Plateau that would no longer be dependent on the government. What they hoped for was 
both a docile native population that would adopt white farming practices, and a pliant 
nature that would allow them to do so. The Indian Service did not consider local 
environmental and cultural exigencies in making their plans for irrigation projects. And
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that was their fatal mistake when they entered the twentieth century, and attempted 
projects on a heretofore unimagined scale.
If the nineteenth century is marked by optimistic naïveté, and a not a little 
blundering, then the early twentieth is a great contrast. Except for the blunders, that is; 
they only got worse. As the Indian Service designed larger and larger waterworks, their 
naïveté gave way to professionalization, and optimism was replaced by the realities of 
building large reclamation projects in the desert. Professional engineers took the place of 
individual agents, and the Indian Service soon had its own Irrigation Division. 
Progressive Era reformers dictated much that happened in this phase of irrigation history. 
Reclamation on a large scale was beginning to be thought of as a way to make much of 
the West inhabitable. After the turn of the century, irrigation became a larger, regional 
issue, even a national concern. And though few historians have done so, projects on 
Indian reservations must be factored into this national context. In the nineteenth century 
individual Agents ran reclamation efforts. They were not part of a national scheme; they 
were merely trying to satisfy the needs of the particular reservation they oversaw. When 
they saw fit, they asked for money to build small dams or ditches. In the twentieth 
century. Agents no longer occupied such a position. Irrigation efforts were now run by a 
professional class of engineers, and the Indian Service allocated annual appropriations in 
the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Indian Service became ensconced in the 
gospel of irrigation.
For projects on a more regional scale, the importance o f  irrigation for Indians, and brief sketches o f  
various projects see, Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880- 
1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992,reprint o fth e  1984 University o f  Nebraska Press 
edition), 169-171; Donald L. Parman, Indians and the American West in the Twentieth Century 
(Bloomington: Indian Univ. Press, 1994), 22-23; Pisani, Chapters 7 and 8 mNatiottalizmg the Waters, Janet
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The history of irrigation development among the Navajo and Zuni Indians is one 
marked by failure. What I intend to demonstrate is that the government did not always 
run rampant over nature or Indians, rendering them both defenseless and defeated. Gn 
the contrary, irrigation efforts on the Colorado Plateau demonstrate cases where tlie 
Indian Service misunderstood both nature and Indians, with costly results. The pace of 
irrigation efforts was guided by Indians and nature. Ultimately, the Indian Service had 
little control over the outcome of their projects. I will show how the climate change and 
the cultural vigor of the Indian people of the Colorado Plateau kept irrigation efforts from 
being successful. When the focus of development became the Zuni dam, all other 
projects fell by the wayside. This resulted in neglect, underdevelopment, and a loosening 
of control over the Navajo and their eventual transformation back to pastoralism.
Climate and Indian cultural resilience were not the only factors that guided this story— 
politics and economics have a part; too. No two factors alone can ever explain history. 
But in the research that I have done they stand out, overwhelmingly, as barriers to Indian 
Service plans for the region."
Historian Steve J. Stem characterized the conquistadors’ sixteenth century 
“discovery” of the Americas as a quest for a series of utopias—wealth, high social status, 
and successful Christian conversion of Indians. All were visions of utopia, but they 
competed with one another. More important than the conquistadors’ mutual antagonism
McDonnell, “Land and Water; Federal Irrigation Projects on Indian Reservations,” in The Dispossessiott o f  
the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, ! 991 ). Pisani s is the only one o f  
these books not to be exclusively an Indian history that takes into account Indians in the irrigation movement 
o f the early twentieth century. His book, when published, will be the most thorough account o f  federal 
efforts to reclaim Indian land— two chapters are devoted to the subject.
" Climate has changed history on the Colorado Plateau before this, too. See Robert C. Euler, George J. 
Gumerman, Thor N V Karlstrom, Jefïfey S. Dean, Richard H. Hevly, “The Colorado Plateaus; Cultural
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over their visions of what the New World should be, however, was “the formidable array 
of Indian initiative and responses.” Just as in early America, in the American West 
Indian agents and reformers envisioned a utopia—settled Indians in self-supporting 
farming enterprises. But there were also conflicting visions of that utopia: were the 
Navajo farmers or were they pastoralists, for example? But they all knew that 
reclamation of water would redeem Indians; Indians would become independent farmers 
and learn the value of private property and hard work. If this worked the Indian Service 
could turn its back on Indians; they would no longer be dependent. To be sure, Indian 
Agents were not conquistadors, but just as “indigenous responses unraveled European 
expectations” in the sixteenth century, so too did they in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Centuries before reclamation efforts began on the Colorado Plateau 
“Amerindian peoples fully engaged the struggle to define what the conquest meant.” 
And in the period that I will cover they were no less engaged in that struggle. Not 
consciously engaging Indians in the struggle, and I would add the environment to Stem’s 
calculus, proved fatal to the Indian Service’s utopia.’^
In American environmental history there are few works that provide one with 
models for how to engage Indians actively in history. Too often they are a foil for the 
destructive behavior of white Americans—before whites came Indians lived in harmony 
with nature and their lives should be used as object lessons. Environmental history 
frequently lapses into descriptions of a lost and pristine world that existed when only 
Indians and nature graced the planet—the Indian past is mined for examples o f how to
Dynamics and Paleoenvironment; Prehistoric cultural changes on the Colorado Plateaus were 
contemporaneous with environmental changes,” Science 205(1979): 1089-1101,
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live in the present and the future. The impression is that Indians tiptoed across the earth 
until the boots of white America stomped over them and the environment. In one of the 
best known environmental histories of reclamation, Donald Worster does this very thing. 
In Rivers o f  Empire, the Zuni and other Indians are used as symbols of harmony with 
nature; their way of living with the desert was harmless. But once capitalism moved 
west, destructive ways of knowing nature supplanted peaceful ones. Indians in his story 
are used only to juxtapose two ways of knowing and using nature: precapitalist and 
capitalist. We really learn little about Indians. Indeed, they seem to be thought of as 
inextricable from nature. Were we to take this version of Indian history as solid and 
unshakable there would be little reason for trying to find ways in which Indians managed 
to engage in their own history, for Indians and their ways of knowing nature appear to be 
gone.
I try hard not to be guilty of the sins listed above. My hope is not to paint a 
picture of good guys and bad guys. The engineers and agents in this story are most often 
guilty of arrogance bom from ignorance. They appear hapless, to be sure, but, hopefully, 
not evil. The story plays out on the Indians’ home turf, whereas the whites are on foreign 
ground. Thus, what happens is often more a learning experience and shock to them than 
it is to the Indians. They are perpetually flummoxed by the weather, Indian ceremonial
Steve J. Stem, “Paradigms o f  Conquest; History, Historiography, and Politics," Jourtml o f  Latin 
American Studies 24 (1992): 7, 15.
Donald Worster, Rivers o f  Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f  the American West (N ew  York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), 32-36. I realize that Worster was not writing Indian history and should not be 
taken to task for a book that he should have written but did not But on the other hand, one imagines that 
all vestiges o f  what he calls the local subsistence mode are wiped out. We differ. I imagine the history o f  
the West, or anywhere for that matter, as a series o f  layers, a palimpsest, and those layers continually nose 
their way to the fore and then retreat, and vice-versa . The past never simply vanishes.
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life and agricultural and hunting practices. Both the Indians and the whites must respond 
to each other.
No good histoiy evolves in a vacuum. Debts are owed to previous work. And in 
this thesis, I will draw on two works that have provided me with substantial capital. The 
notion that there are competing visions of what nature is, and that those differing visions 
serve to inform environmental history, has been explored recently in two books. Mart 
Stewart’s 'Wliat Nature Sttffers to Groe': Life, Labor, and Landscape on the Georgia 
Coast, 1680-1920, and Louis Warren’s The Hunter's Game: Poachers and 
Conservationists in Twentieth Century America. Both Stewart and Warren demonstrate, 
in vastly different geographical spaces, that nature means different things to different 
people. Different ways of knowing nature often clash and serve to produce outcomes 
other than the one intended by the dominant group—planters and conservationists, 
respectively. Both works demonstrate how local responses unraveled particular utopian 
visions.
Stewart and Warren write into their stories people who are often not accorded 
agency in determining their own histories. In Stewart’s case, slaves direct their own 
history as much as the planters do and vice-versa; in Warren’s book, the poor, Italian 
immigrants, and Indians foul up the plans of twentieth century conservationists by 
defiantly utilizing nature—in this case hunting—in ways in which they have for 
generations, contrary to the visions of the conservationists. And in both books, 
environmental forces, some man-made and some not, direct history. Not taking into 
account differing ways of knowing nature, and understanding the world at large, proved 
fatal to both conservationists and planters. This thesis takes the same position: the Indian
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Service’s utopia on the Colorado Plateau was thwarted by Indian responses and by the 
natural environment, both of which the Indian Service mistakenly thought could be 
controlled or, alternately, did not consider. In this case, it is not merely that Indians and 
the environment have not been accorded adequate agency by historians, but they were not 
factored in when the history was being made. Thus, there is a dual burden: writing them 
into the historiography and, at the same time, retrieving them from history.
On the sea coast of antebellum Georgia, historian Mart Stewart found that in 
order to wrest a profit from the land planters needed to “maintain an ordered equilibrium 
of social relations to sustain the fragile ecological ones.” The folk beliefs of the slaves— 
some brought from Africa, others that metastasized in America as Christianity seeped 
into their religions—were thought of as foolishness by their masters. Concerns over 
health and the origins of diseases, for example, struck master and slave very differently. 
In an instance when several slaves look sick on the Butler plantation, and a dozen or so 
died on a neighboring plantation, slaves and masters took the root cause to be two very 
different things. Slaves believed that they had been cursed by a conjurer; the plantation’s 
head driver; the overseer, on the other hand, thought this was nonsense, and put the 
sickness down to one of the many “fevers” that periodically befell the human population
Agency, o f  course, does not mean that nature and people act with calculated precision in every decision 
they make, aware o f  the consequences at all times. Indeed, nature has no consciousness, per se. Rather, 
human and natural agency plug into a structure that is built as much by their actions as anything. Anthony 
Giddens has written, “Human agency and structure... are logically implicated with one another. Structure is 
the very medium o f  the ‘human’ element o f  human agency. At the same time, agency is the medium o f  
structure, which individuals routinely reproduce in their activities.” I merely add, not indefensibly, the 
environment to  the medium o f  structure in determining history. Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and 
Modern Sociology (Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1987), 221 ; Giddens, who has written widely on the 
subject, defmes agency thusly, “Agency concerns events o f  which an individual is the perpetrator, in the 
sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence o f  conduct, have acted differently ” The 
Comiiiiition o f  Society: Outline o f  the Theoiy o f  Structuration (Berkeley: Univ. o f  California Press, 1984) 
9.
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in this malarial environment. But whatever the cause the result was the same; a contested 
version of what the disease meant. And this threatened the fragile equilibrium of the 
plantation.'^
Slaves, Stewart avers, wanted to retain control over matters concerning their 
bodies, while masters sought to manage not only the slaves production, but also their 
reproduction—a realm that slaves were reluctant to let outsiders into. Competing 
interests over health and reproduction, Stewart maintains, resembled contestations over 
the environment. “The clear distinctions that [planters and overseers] made between the 
spiritual and the material worlds and between humans and their activities and the 
working of the natural world were not commonly made by slaves.” When the 
equilibrium of social relations was threatened, problems with production occurred on the 
plantation. Slaves knew the environment better than the planters. Little in nature was 
outside their ken, thus keeping that balance was essential to the successful operation of 
the plantation. In an environment as tough to work as the tidewater of the Georgia coast, 
control over labor was as essential as control over the environment; but planters rarely 
maintained total control over either one. Competing versions of the natural and spiritual 
worlds saw to it that the process of manipulating the environment and people was a 
constant process of negotiation between master and slave. It is the conversation, indeed, 
at times the argument, that takes place between culture and nature that shapes history. 
Neither one acts upon the other without a rebuttal; both have agency. The Indian Service 
encountered similar problems on the Colorado Plateau. Discussing Stewart’s work on 
the Georgia coast serves to show that problems between competing versions of nature.
Mart A. Stewart, 'What Nature Suffers to Groe life . Labor, atid Landscape on the Georgia Coast,
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that result in attempts at social control, occurred not only in Indian America, but 
elsewhere as well. Both on the Georgia coast and on the Colorado Plateau equilibrium of 
social relations was rarely achieved. And, on the Colorado Plateau, this kept the 
irrigation enterprise from being successful.'^
Louis Warren’s The Hunter's Game also manages to give agency to nature and 
other, often silent voices in conservation history. Conservation of hunting grounds in the 
public interest—to keep them out of the hands of the elite—was not the democratic 
process that the consensus on conservation history would have us believe.'’ The 
Hunter's Game traverses three disparate geographies and tells three different stories. But 
they all convey that in the United States, over the last century, there were local, unique 
ways of knowing the natural world and that those ways were, in the main, supplanted by 
extra-local control. And that extra-local control was primarily federal or state 
government. Warren argues in this wonderful book that local commons—natural space 
that was “managed” and used for the benefit of a local population—has been taken over 
by a centralized power that has tried to implant a single, national way of knowing nature. 
And in each case this has meant that certain groups get marginalized, the poor, 
immigrants, and Indians. In Warren’s story, local uses of hunting grounds gradually gave 
way to extra-local control of those hunting grounds. What was once a local commons, 
governed by local custom, was subverted by a national conservation agenda that tried to
J6S0-I920 (Athens, Ga. : Univ. o f  Georgia Press, 1996), 139.
145,
See, for example, Samuel P Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement. 1890-1920 (Cambridge; Harvard Univ Press, 1959). Hays recognizes that the top  
down way that conservation leaders envisioned resource planning working often clashed with local interests. 
But these were white interests, often local elites. At the very least he was speaking o f  local property 
owners, something the poor Italians and Indians in Warren’s book were not. For a good criticism o f
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create a national commons. Warren’s book tracks the story from state control to an 
admixture of state and national control to one of complete national control. In each of 
the three case studies—Italian immigrants in Pennsylvania, Apaches and Navajos in New 
Mexico, and Blackfeet in Montana—extra-local interests tried to and did supplant local 
ways of knowing nature. But it was a bit more complex than that. In all three cases, 
local white elites gleefully went along for the ride if it meant curtailing access to hunting 
by any one of the above mentioned groups. Thus, it was more than a contest over 
redefining local hunting grounds, it was battle over access.
Conservationists wanted to preserve hunting grounds for the common man, and in 
the case of Glacier National Park, they wanted to curtail hunting altogether. In all three 
case studies Warren demonstrates that the utopian notion of the conservationists-— 
limiting access essentially to white hunters who could afford the cost of a license— 
unraveled as contingencies they did not expect kept creeping up on them. At Glacier, 
conservationists tried to create a natural utopia, a “world of people on the outside, [and a] 
world of nature on the inside.” But boundaries do not quite work that way, and the effect 
of restricting hunting was an ungulate irruption that devastated park fauna. The Park 
Service even resorted to feeding the deer and elk to keep them from starving and away 
from Indian hunters outside the Park. Eventually, once the Park elk population reached 
critical mass, the Park Service chased the animals out of Glacier to be hunted by the 
same Blackfeet they were trying to protect the deer and elk from in the first place! Lack
conservation history see, Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Reclamation, 1891-1911,” Forest and 
Conservation History 37 (1993): 68-79, especially 76,
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of understanding of previous, local ways of using nature proved fatal to the Park 
Service’s utopia. It was rendered a pipe dream.
This thesis follows Warren’s and Stewart’s leads. Local responses—from both 
the environment and Indians—to extra-local forces kept the irrigation enterprise from 
being successful. The Indian Service’s inability to achieve social and ecological 
equilibrium because of conflicting ways of conceiving of the natural world also proved 
disastrous. The agricultural utopia that the Indian Service envisioned on the Colorado 
Plateau failed to engage Indians actively in the process. The Navajo and Zuni, however, 
directed events more than the Indian Service could have ever imagined. As Steve Stem 
said, failure to engage the Indians proved disastrous.
Louis Warren, “Blackfeet and Boundaries at Glacier National Park,” in The Hunter's Game (N ew  Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1997), quote on 128.
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The Climate on the Colorado Plateau: Perceptions and Reality with Some 
Thoughts on Climate History
To Indian agents in the late nineteenth century, the semi-arid Colorado Plateau 
was like no landscape they had ever seen. The dryness, wind, and lack of green 
vegetation evoked feelings akin to hostility in many of the agents. The scarcity of water 
was frightening to many of them. More than one considered the land barren and useless. 
D M. Riordan, agent on the Navajo reservation in the early 1880s, thought the Navajo 
country to be the “most worthless land that ever laid out-doors. It is wholly a sandstone 
mesa country, with occasional patches of valley land susceptible to cultivation by the 
rude Indian methods. It is almost waterless—in fact, a barren, rocky desert... The face of 
the country is almost entirely rock. Rock everywhere.”' Rarely, if ever, did they marvel 
at the landscape. In almost all instances they saw the Colorado Plateau in negative tenus. 
Officials of the U.S. government rarely had anything but contempt for the landscape of 
the Southwest. Indeed, the hostility felt toward the region kept it from being heavily 
explored and administrated. Only after white population skyrocketed did the U.S. 
government take an active role in administering the region. Before 1890, to be sure, 
there was a military presence in the region, but the government’s limited resources saw to 
it that other, more profitable, less hostile regions of the West got attention. After 1890, 
and the increase in trade because of the railroad and mining, the region was taken more 
seriously. As irrigation gained currency, the Southwest was looked on in a different
‘ D M Riordan quoted in Herbert Welsh, “Report o f  a Visit to the Navajo, Pueblo, and Hualapais Indians o f  
New Mexico and Arizona” (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1885), 37.
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light. But the initial lack of interest in the Southwest was due, in large part, to 
perceptions of its climate, physical environment, and Indian population. “
In the 1880s, agents were very eager to get reclamation works underway. But the 
semi-arid climate was tricky; it at once intensified the pace of irrigation efforts and 
fooled the agents. The lack of frequent rain and the presence of few permanent streams 
and springs convinced agents that they needed to build waterworks. However, when rain 
did fall it came in torrents. Ephemeral streams that lay dormant much of the year came 
to life during the two rainy seasons: December-March and June-August. The attendant 
floods washed out the small dams and ditches the agents built They repeated this cycle 
year after year throughout the first phase of irrigation history. Their desire to see the 
desert bloom, and the constant turnover of agents, blinded them to the yearly cycle of 
rain and flooding. The agents’ conceptions of the climate are of particular importance, 
for it was their impressions that guided irrigation efforts in the region. They had very 
little information to go on in this early phase of irrigation history, and they generally 
made their decisions based on their impressions.
Early Spanish visitors to the Southwest, particularly the Colorado Plateau country 
of New Mexico, found the climate, except for the cold winters, to be favorable. They 
remarked on wide valleys and grasslands that would make for good pasturage. Abundant 
streams were noted, too. Probably coming as they did from the arid and semiarid regions 
of Mexico and Spain, the climate of New Mexico did not impress them as significantly 
different. The climate of Mexico, and even parts of Spain, prepared them for the 
conditions in New Mexico. But when Anlgos arrived from the East, they formed wholly
Robert Wooster, “’A Difficult and Forlorn Country’: The Military Looks at the American Southwest,
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different impressions. Explorers in the early 1850s found the region barren and devoid of 
economic prospects. They noted that grass was abundant in places, and scarce in others. 
In 1849, Lieutenant J.H. Simpson, on an exploratory mission of the Navajo country, said 
that one would have a hard time looking on the country “without a sense of loathing.” 
Early white explorers of the region, concerned with grass and water for their stock and 
themselves, make good sources of information regarding environmental conditions—if 
only impressionistic ones. The diaries and official reports of explorers gathered and 
analyzed by Luna Leopold reveal a Southwest at best marginal. Account after account 
reports on the difficulty in finding forage and water. But other, conflicting impressions 
could be formed, too. Only a few years after Simpson, other Anglos from the East 
remarked on the salubrity of the climate. W.W.H. Davis, U.S. Attorney in New Mexico, 
said that a better climate could not be found anywhere in the world.'
What accounts for these wildly varying accounts? Geographers Yi-Fu Tuan and 
Cyril Everhard argue that a sudden, but brief, shift in the climate in the early 1850s 
changed the appearance of much of New Mexico. In Santa Fe, for example, there was 
fully three times as much rain in both 1854 and 1855 as there was in 1850. Thus, two 
different observers, only a few years apart, were able to have quite varied impressions of 
the landscape due to a marked increase in rainfall. This may seem an obvious conclusion 
to draw. Naturally, two different people coming to New Mexico at different times under 
different weather conditions would report varying impressions. But more important than 
that, it illustrates the fluctuation of New Mexico’s climate and exemplifies a common
1850-1890,” Arizona and the West 28(1986) 355.
 ̂Tuan and Everhard, 271-274; Luna Leopold, “Vegetation o f  Southwestern Watersheds in the Nineteenth 
Century,” The Geographical Review 41(1951): 295-316,
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phenomena later in the century; As the turnover of Indian agents occurred on an almost 
biannual basis in the 1880s and 90s, they gathered quick, impressionistic views on the 
climate of the region. A dry summer alarmed agents; a wet one delighted them. Like 
Simpson and Davis, agents following in the heels of one another could have varying 
impressions of the climate. Gathering any long term impressions of what New Mexico’s 
climate was like seemed impossible. None of them stayed long enough to gather any 
strategies for how to deal with the capricious climate. They formed opinions generally 
devoid of value when it came time to plan major reclamation projects. Herbert Welsh, 
not an agent himself but president of the Indian Rights Association, was hopeful that “the 
approach of the civilization and the introduction of the railroads are producing some 
modification of the climate here, as they seem to have done in other parts of the West.” 
If this was the kind of information that planners had to go on—a slightly modified rain 
follows the plow prediction—then successful reclamation projects would be unlikely. As 
mentioned in the introduction, when the climate did take a noticeable turn toward a 
series of wet years at the turn of the twentieth century, the lack of captured information, 
and often contradictory impressions, proved damaging to reclamation efforts.*
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century a drought desiccated the 
Southwest. In the last half-millennia only one other drought has been worse, that 
between 1573-1593. But the dry cycle that visited the Southwest between 1879 and 1904
Tuan and Everhard; Welsh, 33; On the concept o f  capturing see Carole Crumley, “The Ecology o f  
Conquest; Contrasting Agropastoral and Agricultural Societies’ Adaptation to Climate Change,’’ and Joel D. 
Gunn, “Global Climate Change and Regional Biocultural Diversity,” in Historical Exology: Cultural 
Knowledge and Changing Landscapes (Santa Fe. School o f  American Research Press, distributed by Univ. 
o f Washington Press, 1994); John W. Bennett, “Adaptations by Tribal and M odem Populations to the North 
American Plains and other Arid and Semiarid Lands: A  Survey o f  Issues and Problems,” in John W. Bennett, 
Humati Ecology as Human Behasnor: Essays in Environmental and Development Anthropology' (New  
Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 160.
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was the longest running. Less rainfall fell during the previous cycle, but the modem 
drought was longer in duration. Exacerbating the modem drought was the presence of 
sheep and a greater human population.^ Within the major drought there were anomalous 
years, to be sure. And the agents who came to the Colorado Plateau, of course, had no 
idea that they were enduring a string of the driest years of the last millennia. After 1905, 
the region experienced its longest run of wet years. Again, there were dry years 
throughout, just as there were yet years during the drought. However, the two general 
trends of dry, then wet, can safely be established.*"
Most importantly, the dry and wet trends closely parallel the movements of the 
Indian Service in the area. In the last twenty years of the nineteenth century agents first 
attempted reclamation. As the effects of the drought—livestock reduction, disappearing 
springs—began to be noticed the Indian Service determined that more needed to be done 
to secure water than individual agents could do with limited resources. What little 
information agents did capture during the nineteenth century only prepared them for 
drought. But providence was not on the side of the Indian Service. Plans for a major 
dam on the Zuni reservation were made during the drought, but construction of the 
Blackrock Dam coincided precisely with the cycle of increased rainfall and flooding. As 
ad hoc efforts gave way to professional ones, drought was replaced by rain and floods. 
The shift, in climate and the deepening of commitment to irrigation converged in the 
early twentieth century. And this had serious implications for reclamation. Costs
 ̂On the increase in sheep, see Denevan, “Livestock Numbers..
 ̂Schuhnan, 43-46, and see note seven in the introduction for further evidence o f  the drought and 
subsequent wet years.
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escalated year after year as more rain and flooding destroyed waterworks on the Zuni and 
Navajo reservations.
The drought years of the late nineteenth century gave way to ill informed 
predictions of stream flow. Because no long term monitoring had been done, combined 
with a general refusal to tap Indian memory of weather, the Indian Service had scant data 
to go on in planning reclamation projects. There is no doubt that the Navajo, for 
example, could have provided the Indian Service with at least some information on the 
climate. Their knowledge of the cycles of the weather and the character of rain, for 
example, might have given the Indian Service some indication of the mercurial nature of 
the weather. The Zunis’ and the Navajos’ intimate knowledge of plant life, what grew 
where and under what conditions, would have proved useful to the Indian Service. The 
Navajo identified more than one type of the rain. In some years, or in different seasons 
the male rain—heavy, and often destructive— fell; and in others, the female rain—light, 
and good for crops—dampened the ground. It is possible, maybe even likely, that the 
Navajo and Zuni had a storehouse of collective memories regarding when in the past 
different types of rain fell, or when plants dependent on one type of rain or another did 
well or poorly. This type of information was not written down; it was embedded in the 
knowledge that was collected over centuries of living on the Colorado Plateau. In 
calculating how much rain would fall each year, and hence the capacity of the reservoir 
at Zuni, the single most important factor was the “character of the rain storms.” The 
water planners needed to know just when the heavy rains fells, and how heavy they could
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be. That is, they needed to know: when did male rain come and when did female rain 
come?’
The lack of information concerning the climate led to costly errors. In 1903, after 
making an inspection of the Zuni dam site, W.H. Code, then an inspector for the Indian 
Service and later Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Division, concluded with great 
confidence that the highest floods his calculations could predict for the Zuni River would 
be a mere 3,000 to 4,000 cubic feet per second. By 1907, after witnessing four seasons of 
destructive flooding, he changed his tune and estimated that 9,000 cubic feet per second 
was a conservative figure. Code’s initial estimate was only based on well informed 
guesses, however. Code felt that he could rely only on the few white residents in the area 
for any anecdotal evidence of stream flow. The well spring of information that was 
captured over the centuries by the Indians in the region was not tapped by Indian agents 
or Irrigation Division water planners. Rather, year after year, they seemed intent on 
reinventing the wheel, or rather the humid East, and not looking to the long term 
residents of the region for guidance regarding the climate.*
After twenty years of drought the Indian Service was hardly prepared for the 
torrents of rain, and attendant freshets that filled the region’s waterways in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. The climate change dampened irrigation plans. W.H. 
Code, Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Division of the Indian Service, reported that the
 ̂Matilda Coxe Stevenson, “Ethnobotany o f  the Zuni Indians,” M S# 4841 and “Notes on Medical Botany,” 
M S# 2089; W.W. Hill, “Field N otes and Draft o f  Manuscript on the Agricultural and Hunting Methods o f  
the Navajo Indians,” 1933, M S# 7101, National Anthropological Archives (NAA), Smithsonian Institution, 
Washington, D C ,  Washington Matthews, “Navajo Names for Plants,” American Naturalist 20 (1886); 767- 
777; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 13 April 1903, Box 212 , SC 190, RG 75, NA.
* W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 13 April 1903, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; W.H Code to 
John B. Harper, Superintendent o f  Irrigation, 28 December 1907, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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weather conditions of 1905 were the worst “known to the oldest inhabitant of New 
Mexico.” One long term observer of the Southwest, Matilda Coxe Stevenson, wrote 
from Taos in 1906 that she had never experienced such high winds and rains as she did 
that summer. And John B Harper reported that the whole “face of the country is 
changed.” He wrote later that summer, “since the end of September 1904, the entire 
southwest has been having a period of great and frequent storms and unusual weather 
conditions, and this has added greatly to the difficulties and uncertainties of the 
[irrigation] enterprise.”  ̂ The drought of the last century was over. And the Indian 
Service was faced with a new challenge; where once drought made their work seem 
crucial, heavy rain and flooding now stymied their efforts.
Infusing the history of climate into human history is a tricky business. Personally, 
I have been warned not to take slight fluctuations outside of the “normal” variegated 
weather on the Colorado Plateau as scientific proof of a climate c h a n g e . I  would 
counter that impressionistic data gathered concerning climate can be more important, as 
argued above, than a scientifically proven climate change. In using climate as a 
causative factor in history there are limitations that exist and methodological problems 
that are difficult to overcome. Climate cannot be looked at in a vacuum; the risk is too 
great of making deterministic conclusions. Climate is never the only factor involved in 
altering history. Indeed, in many discussions of the role of climate in history, extreme 
caution is advised. In particular, historians are wary of ascribing any significance to
 ̂W.H Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 12 December 1905, RG 75, SC 190, B ox 212, NA; Matilda 
Coxe Stevenson to  William Henry Holmes, 7 July 1906, Stevenson Correspondence, 1890-1918, B ox 6a, 
NAA; John B. Harper to CIA, 5 July 1906, #41728, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 8 
January 19 0 6 ,, #67729, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA. For sources regarding the climate change see note 
9 in the introduction.
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short term climatic change. The common wisdom says that if quantifiable data cannot be 
gathered that proves that climate was indeed a factor in affecting history than we would 
be better served dismissing it, or, at the very least, listing it as one of many factors 
determining history. In using climate as a pivot point in this story I have tried to use 
caution. I do not think that the short term climatic pulse that occurred at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was the only variable in shaping Navajo and Zuni history. But it 
was very important. ' ’
Short term climate change gets short shrift in discussions of climate and history. 
Economic historian Jan de Vries is skeptical of its influence on historical events. Short 
term “exogenous shocks” likely have no effect on economic history, Just as the history of 
bank robberies surely have no effect on the history of banking. Acknowledging his 
remarks as sarcastic and overstated, de Vries, nevertheless, remains unwilling to look at 
short term change as anything but descriptive and speculative. In his estimation, 
gathered from the insights of Emanuel LeRoy Ladurie, societies settle back into a 
“normal” routine after short term pulses, and their effects remain difficult to detect. The 
reluctance that Ladurie and de Vries share on this issue comes from their insistence on 
studying long-term trends. As de Vries say, “The possibility that long-term changes in
Personal communication from William R. Baron, 29 July 1997, in author’s possession.
The literature on climate change and history is vast. The following have been some o f  the most 
instructive. M.J. Ingram, G. Farmer, and T.M.L. Wigley, “Past Climates and their impact on Man: a 
review,” in Climate and History: Studies in past climates and their impact on Man, Wigley, Ingram, and 
Farmer, eds. (Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), while the authors generally eschew short term 
climate change, they do concede that “[tjhere may conceivably be grounds for ascribing greater importance 
to a few isolated climatic events which happened to impinge on key historical situations,” 27, which is 
precisely what I contend is the case at the turn o f  the century in the Southwest; Jan De Vries, “Measuring 
the Impact o f  Climate on History: The Search for Appropriate M ethodologies,” in Climate and Histoiy: 
Studies in Interdisciplinary History, Robert 1 Rotbergand Theodore K. Rabb, eds. (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1981); Emanuel LeRoy Ladurie, “The Historical Study o f  Climate,” in Times o f  Feast, Times o f  
Famine: A History o f Climate Since the Year 1000 (New York: Doubleday, 1971); William R. Baron, 
“Retrieving American Climate History: A Bibliographic Essay,” Agricultural History 63 (1989): 7-35.
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climate might play a role in historical explanation constitutes the most exciting 
dimension of climate history.” According to de Vries, too often studies of short terra 
climate change fall into the “harm done” mode of thinking; they merely describe how 
deleterious a climate change was. (I would add that the converse could be true, but agree 
that most describe harmful effects.) And the ultimate irrelevance of this type of study is 
proven, in the end, by the fact that societies adapt. Thus, studying short term change 
serves little or no end but to describe conditions at a given moment in time. But that 
given moment in time can have lasting effects. If the short term pulse can be shown to 
suggest, or prove, lasting effects, then it should be considered as more than a blip on the 
historical record. Thomas Hall has drawn an apt metaphor. If we can think of social 
change as a ratchet and pawl mechanism, then short term climate change can be shown to 
have lasting effects. Hall’s metaphor applies to levels of incorporation but can be 
applied to other situations. It works like this; a technology or exogenous shock, for 
example, is introduced into a society, or band, and if it comes at the right moment in time 
then the outside force can be very hard to resist. It introduces changes that alter history 
in fundamental ways. Once the Comanche acquired horses the ecology of their hunting 
grounds became so drastically changed that reverting back to foraging became 
impossible. There is always some slippage, but reversal becomes more and more 
difficult, I would include short term climate change, at particular historical moments, as 
having potential to act on this principle. The short term climate change forced the Indian 
Service to reevaluate reclamation projects and its relationship with the Zuni and Navajo.
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Additionally, it led the Indian Service, as 1 will show, to overstock the Navajo reservation 
with sheep as they realized the folly of reclaiming Navajoland.
deVries’s thinking smacks of some sort of excessive, backwards relativism. That 
is, in it most extreme form, relativism posits that all instances, or thoughts, or value 
systems, have equal merit and thus none can be judged better than another. If we accept 
de Vries’s way of seeing short term climate change then no short term change can have 
any significance. And that’s not relative to one another, that’s the category as a whole. 
If all “societies in the long run adjust,” then there is no point in studying short term 
change because we already the know the outcome (in a general, not a specific, sense). 
Not all cases have their own merits that need to be weighed regarding peculiar, local 
circumstances. Rather, historians should dispense with short term studies because 
adaptation will occur and it is that adaptation that should be studied I agree that the 
adaptations to climate changes should be studied, but so, too, should short term climate 
change. The reluctance to study short term change strikes me as odd. One could argue 
that any “exogenous shock,” such as war, will eventually subside and societies will adapt. 
But, first of all, isn’t figuring out what those short term changes are an important task? If 
we are to figure out in what ways societies adapt, is it not imperative that we find out 
what events they are adapting to? On the Colorado Plateau, in the early twentieth 
century, the Indian Service attempted to adapt to a semiarid environment. What they did 
not know was that they were, in fact, adapting to a short term climatic change—the 1879- 
1904 drought. The drought was, of course, part of a series of climate changes tracked 
over the Course of nearly seven centuries. When the Indian Service attempted adaptation.
Thomas D. Hall, Social Change in the Southwest. 1350~I880 (Lawrence: Univ. Press o f  Kansas, 1987),
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another climate change occurred, this time in the form of a series of wet years. They 
adapted to this, too. Understanding how this climatic change forced the adaptations that 
it did strikes me as the important task. Too, as I have said, the agents and engineers 
living the history considered what was going on important, and retrieving their 
impressions of the relevance of the climate change is crucial.
Short term climatic change in this instance has singular importance. Indian 
policy was evolving at such a rapid pace during this time that otherwise insignificant 
events like a short term climatic change could have profound etYects. Fifty years in the 
past a short term change may not have had lasting effects; Indians would have adapted. 
But as the Indian Service shifted from policies that discouraged large-scale reclamation 
efforts to ones that embraced them—based largely on a national movement that endorsed 
reclamation—the climate changed. The shifts in Indian Service policy were 
accompanied by sudden changes in the climate. Institutional change paralleled 
environmental change. And this is why this short term change is important; it can be 
directly linked to another, contemporaneous historical change. This is, of course, a 
historical coincidence. But it may point to the need to further consider short term climate 
change as an important shaper of history.
n
On the surface, increase in rainfall may not appear to be dramatic. An inch 
difference between one year and the next, either up or down, when spread out over a
21 .
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whole state or region is a meaningless statistic. To say that the Colorado Plateau 
experienced either an upward or downward trend only takes on meaning when one 
examines local conditions. One needs to look at local examples, judged upon local 
topography, settlement patterns, and in the case of this study, irrigation development, to 
be able to gauge the impact of seemingly incremental average increases in rainfall. As 
Luna Leopold cautioned, “It should be remembered that annual values of precipitation 
may obscure short-period features in the rainfall pattern which in themselves might have 
great significance.” ’̂
If one examines the rainfall statistics for Tuba, Arizona, at the western edge of the 
Navajo Reservation, one would see that between 1897 and 1913 the mean annual rainfall 
is a mere 5.30 inches. That’s not much. However, upon closer examination of the 
monthly rainfall, and the shifts in which month that rain comes, one finds illuminating 
information. In November 1905 and 1906, for instance, 2.5 to 3.0 inches of rain fell, 
when compared with other Novembers in which somewhere between a trace and 1 inch 
fell. And remember, November falls outside the normal rainy season. Take another 
example: In January of 1907, 2.0 inches of rain fell at Tuba, but the mean given is .49 
for 1897 to 1913 One-half inch of rain is not a destructive amount, but two surely is if 
waterworks projects are in the way of the inevitable floods that that much rain would 
likely produce. And in most years, again, somewhere between a trace and 1 inch of rain 
fell on the desert at Tuba.
Luna Leopold, “Rainfall Frequency: An Aspect o f  Climatic Variation,” Transactions, American 
Geophysical Union 32 (1 9 5 1 );347-357,347 
Herbert Gregory, The Navajo Country: A Geographic and Hydrographic Reconnaissance o f  Parts o f  
Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Supply Paper #380, 64th. Cong., 2"“̂ sess., 
1916, H Doc. 80, Serial 7024, 552-63, 85-87. One o f  the best sources for climate studies on the Colorado
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The same is true for much of the rest of the Colorado Plateau: While mean annual 
increases may not appear significant, local changes, that happen to be in some of the 
same places that the Irrigation Division was building waterworks, could be enormous. 
Increases in local storms, of course, affected stream flow, and thus, flooding patterns. 
The Little Colorado River at Holbrook, Arizona is a good example. In November 1905, 
the mean flow of the river was 1,159 acre feet, higher than any other month of the year, 
but not too much higher in this wettest of years. The mean, of course, is the average of 
the high and the low. And the low for November was a trickle of 30 acre feet. But the 
maximum flow was a staggering and devastating 20,180 acre feet! You could add up the 
flows from 1905-07 and still not approach the flow for that one month.
Along with climatic records, the anecdotal evidence of the change in climate is 
overwhelming. In fact, it is arguably more important than the tree-ring, streamflow, or 
rainfall records. Because the weather changed so dramatically in such a short time, 
Indian Service employees working in the region noted it, almost without exception, in 
their correspondence. It affected their day to day operations. Work had to be stopped 
and costs ran way over budget due to flooding, for example. Using this kind of evidence, 
not in lieu of, but to bolster official records, only makes the case stronger. To the agents 
and engineers on the ground, there was a climate change. The sudden change in the
Plateau is Albert J. Richmond’s “Historical Precipitation Sequences o f  the Colorado Plateau, 1859-1983.” 
Richmond examined fifty long-term stations around the region and compiled a database o f  daily, monthly, 
and yearly precipitation data. Along with precipitation amounts, Richmond also calculated frequency. 
Unfortunately, the massive database that he constructed is now defunct All that remains is his thesis, which 
has graphs charting year by year change. This more general data, however, still bears out the increase in 
rainfall amount and frequency during the period in question.
Gregory.
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weather did affect operations and influence policy decisions.’̂  Citing the climate change 
as the pivot point in the history of irrigation development on the Colorado Plateau comes 
from the anecdotal evidence One could conceivably examine rainfall records alongside 
expenditures on waterworks projects and make some guesses as to how the weather 
affected decisions. But the correspondence leaves no doubt; the climate change affected 
engineers’ and agents’ decisions and behavior.
As we will see in the discussions of the waterworks projects at Navajo and Zuni, 
these local increases in rainfall and attendant flooding had devastating effects on the 
irrigation enterprise. As mentioned earlier, the Zuni River, which through most of the 
late nineteenth century contact period was considered the ideal source for a nemnanent 
water supply, became a torrent when significant rain fell on the Colorado Plateau. In 
1902, the second year of surveys for the Blackrock dam, the Colorado Plateau, according 
to Schulman, experienced the driest year of the twenty-six year drought. Little water 
coursed through the Zuni R iver that year Rut w hen a short term intense change in the  
weather arrived, it spelled disaster for the Zuni dam, as well as other projects. The 
change forced the Indian Service to critically evaluate projects on the Colorado Plateau. 
It appears that they considered the change signs of a permanent condition—the same 
assumption they made about the drought in the closing years of the previous century At 
the very least, they began to wonder if  ever they could get a handle on the climate of the 
Colorado Plateau. With the return of wet weather, the Navajo reservation could be more
William R. Baron, in very good essay on the value o f  American climate history states, “A source o f  
climate date that is perhaps richer in detail and has a better geographic distribution than instrument records is 
qualitative documentation found in such sources as diaries, almanacs, old newspapers, and periodicals,” O f 
course, Ï would add correspondence. William R. Baron, “Retrieving American Climate History . A  
Bibliographic Essay” Agricultural History 63( 1989).7-35.
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heavily stocked with sheep. The consequences of the overstocking of the Navajo range 
are out of the scope of this study. But the origins of the overstocking come out of this 
era The Indian Service had always recognized that sheep and pastoralism were 
important to the Navajo, but they insisted on developing irrigation works for farming 
Now, after the improvement of the range, a renewed commitment to helping the Navajo 
in their pastoral pursuits marked Indian Service reclamation policy among the Navajo. 
Shifting perceptions of the climate made this possible.
In the late nineteenth century the Indian Service made a concerted effort to get to 
know the Navajo and their homeland. This era of discovery led them to deign the 
reservation and the Navajo worthy of reclamation. The Zunis, on the other hand, while 
scrutinized by anthropologists, did not come under close Indian Service examination. 
Waterworks did not receive the full attention of the Indian Service until the first years of 
the twentieth century The dry, parched looking, arroyo scarred Colorado Plateau 
alarmed Indian agents. Something needed to be done to turn it into a garden.
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“Look at Our Country; We Ought to Be Ashamed of It": Reclamation Efforts 
on the Navajo Reservation, 1883-1900
Many Horses learned from his father and namesake, the Navajo leader Ganado 
Mucho, to reserve a healthy amount of skepticism for prophets and medicine men among 
his people. In the decade after their captivity at Bosque Redondo, and the failure of that 
experiment, the Navajo returned to their homeland, now a much shrunken area and a 
reservation, and tried to regain harmony with their world. But the disaffection that many 
felt at the loss of life and livestock, possibly lubricated by alcohol consumption, caused 
unrest. As a result, a wave of witchcraft washed over the reservation in the late 1870s. 
Navajos and white authorities hunted down scores of witches. Ganado Mucho killed 
even his own uncle in an effort to quell the fervor. Ganado Mucho and Manuelito, 
another Navajo leader, killed between them an estimated forty witches. Ganado Mucho 
was an advocate of peace with whites and the recent unrest threatened to unravel the 
fragile trust that had been achieved.’
Ganado Mucho, consequently, did not trust medicine men—whom he considered 
no better than witches—and urged his son to be wary too, warning him not to fool with 
witchcraft. But in a moment of fragility, when Ganado Mucho was dying, his son spent 
the bulk of his fortune on the services of a medicine man to banish from his father the 
evil spirits that lay within him. He sold his herds of cattle, sheep, and horses. The 
fortunes of Ganado Mucho and Many Horses vanished. Ganado Mucho chastised his son
' Underhill, 160-161; Garrick Bailey and Roberta Glenn Bailey, A History o f  the Navajos: The Reservation 
Years (Santa Fe: School o f  American Research Press, 1986), 33-34; Edward H. Spicer, Cycles o f  Conquest:
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and told him that medicine men have no supernatural power. They are merely charlatans, 
he assured"his son. To his death Ganado Mucho remained firm. Many Horses listened to 
his father, and when confronted with a prophet in his own time, acted accordingly. 
Perhaps he was chagrined by the loss of his fortune. In any case, in death his father 
convinced him to associate prophets and medicine men with witchcraft."
When the Ghost Dance swept across the Great Plains and elsewhere in the West, 
preaching the immanent elimination of the white man and the return of the Buffalo, it 
also had a brief life on the Navajo reservation, although manifested in different form. In 
1890, Nnazi, a Navajo prophet and medicine man, preached to the Navajo that they had 
fallen out of harmony with their old customs and traditions. And because of this their 
grass had gone bad and their herds were diminishing in number. Drought plagued the 
reservation because of Navajo apostasy. Nnazi made a pilgrimage to the sacred San 
Francisco Mountains where Changing Woman revealed this to Nnazi. After consulting 
with Changing Woman, he was transported to the middle of the ocean where he met with 
White Shell Woman. She confirmed that the drought and bad grass were punishment for 
abandoning old ways and “forgetting about the gods of their fathers.” White Shell 
Woman chose Nnazi to lead his people back to harmony. After returning from the 
mountains, Nnazi told his story and he gained a following among the Navajo. Many 
people saw the bad grass around them and their lean herds and took Nnazi’s words for 
the truth. He began to create quite a stir. Additionally, during 1890, an outbreak of a
The Impaci o f  Spain, Mexico, and ihe ihtiies Siuies an the Indians o f  the Scmihwesi, i 535-i960  (Tucson; 
Univ. o f  Arizona Press, 1962), 221.
 ̂ The details o f  this story come from Leopold Osterman to William Henry Holmes, Bureau of/American 
Ethnology (BAE), Letters Received (LR), National Anthropological .Archives (NAA), Smithsonian
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throat disease resembling diphtheria killed 800 Navajos, possibly adding to the troubles 
OR the reserv ation. Clearly something was wrong in the Navajo world. ̂
Many Horses soon heard of Nnazi and having been well trained by his father took 
him for a fake, or perhaps a witch He confronted Nnazi and asked him for proof of his 
meeting with White Shell Woman. Nnazi could produce nothing tangible. The only 
evidence he could offer was the obviously denuded range. Many Horses branded him a 
liar and a schemer only out for power and personal gain. He said that if he truly did meet 
with White Shell Woman, then she, too, was a liar. The reason the grass is so bad— 
Many Horses would at least admit that—was because the Navajo had larger herds and 
thev had eaten all the erass. The Navaio had done nothing wrong. Manv Horses ignored 
the issue of apostasy and put it all down to more animals.
The story is instructive, but must be read with caution. Leopold Osterman, the 
man who recorded the story, had great respect for both Many Horses and his father. He 
marveled at their keen intelligence. But what he seemed to like most in Ganado Mucho 
and his son were their progressive values. Medicine men and prophets could not fool 
them. They were men of sound mind and both had led their people away from belief in 
the superstitions of witchcraft. Osterman took down faithfully what each man told him 
And he took for truth Many Horses’ story. Clearly, Nnazi was a false prophet who only 
sought the approval of his people. Osterman tells us, in what is clearly his voice and not 
Many Horses’, that Nnazi saw in the fervor over the Ghost Dance an “opportunity of 
gaining prestige and profit.” Many Horses’ possessed nobler goals. He would take no
Institution (SI), ‘■Recollections o f  L>ine Tsosi and other Navajo leaders,” 24 June 1907 The information is 
taken from interviews done with various leaders o f  the Navajos and their reflections on their lives.
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part in believing that the current drought and bad grass was any sort of retribution on the 
part of the holy people for Navajo lapses in faith. On the contrary, he knew exactly what 
it was: too many animals.
But Osterman concedes that Nnazi did indeed gain a following. Nnazi's 
followers’ faith in Nnazi’s story was spawned by the obvious condition of the grass and 
the herds. As before, when Ganado Mucho ran witches off the reservation, there was 
genuine trouble When Ganado Mucho took care of witches in his time it was in 
conjunction with increased raiding activity. The delicate peace with whites was 
threatened. Witchcraft only added to an already tense situation on the reservation. In 
1890, when the son mirrored the father’s behavior, there was also real trouble. The range 
was in dire shape. After many years of low rainfall and increased gullying, the increase 
in sheep was finally taking its toll. And the Navajo could see that something was amiss. 
Figuring out just how the Navajo dealt with the problem is hard to do. Records of their 
reactions to the environmental crisis are few. But the above story does provide us with a 
small window into the Navajo reaction to a very real problem. It was a problem that 
some Navajo ascribed to failing out of balance with their religious life. Others, like 
Many Horses, blamed the situation on too many sheep. Indian Agents did not know what 
to make of the disaster. Most took the low rainfall of the 1880s and 90s as normal. 
Although they could see that there was a problem, they did not think the conditions 
anomalous.
But whatever the cause of the drought and the resultant poor condition of the 
range, it was obvious to Navajos and whites alike that there was a problem. White
 ̂Annual Rep<Mt o f  the Commissioner o f  Indian Affairs, Washington, D C  Government Printing Office,
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efforts at confronting the problem of the drought had proved fruitless, and in some 
Navajo circles the drought caused a crisis of faith. Ad hoc reclamation efforts on the 
Navajo reservation had done little to stem the effects of low rainfall. Before 1890, the 
Indian Service put little effort into waterworks projects on the Navajo reservation. After 
1890, when the drought really began to take its toll, the Indian Service was forced to 
examine the situation on the reservation critically. But inertia and concerns elsewhere 
led the Indian Service to neglect the Navajo reservation for much of the 1890s. Only 
after the turn of the century did large-scale projects get serious consideration.
As the final two decades of the nineteenth century wore on the effects of the 
drought discussed in the last chapter began to take their toll on the Colorado Plateau. 
Indian Agents moved into the region and found themselves confronted with a parched 
landscape. Securing water for the Navajo became a primary concern. But they did not 
understand—how could they have?—that the region was undergoing a millennial drought 
and their feeble attempts to control water would ultimately fail. By the 1890s, several 
projects had been tried, none had been successful. The 1890s were a decade of 
reconnaissance. The U.S. Army surveyed Navajo reservation in 1889 and 1892, scouting 
for water and future reclamation possibilities.
When the Indian Agents first arrived on the Colorado Plateau they approached 
irrigation with aplomb. Building a series of flumes, diversion ditches, or dams on 
virtually any type of stream or in any narrow canyon was widely held to be an easy task. 
The fruits of their labor would be Indians who could farm for the market, and at the very 
least for subsistence. D.M. Riordan, the agent at Fort Defiance, on the Navajo
1890, 161, (Hereafter cited as ARCIA and the year.)
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Reservation, wrote, in 1883, that he was fervently trying to “make a garden spot of one of 
the dreariest places on the planet...[which would] move to lift up the Indians here (in a 
material way)."'* But there was little or no systematic plan; the agents were not engineers 
and were newcomers who stayed too little time in the country to get to know it. The 
same mistakes were repeated year after year as the revolving door ushered in and out one 
agent after another.^
In these early days of irrigation development very little money from the annual 
appropriations of the Indian Service was available for waterworks. Irrigation had not yet 
become a permanent feature of the Indian Service’s annual budget and would not for 
another ten years. At this point, irrigation development was done on a case by case basis 
where Agents saw fit to attempt reclamation. Because irrigation did not yet have the 
appeal that it later would have the Indian Service was reluctant to spend money on 
projects that had potential for failure. The federal government was not yet in the 
business of reclamation and was thus skeptical of its benefits. Agents interested in 
irrigation, hoping to assuage the fears of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contended 
that they could irrigate plenty of land for little expense. However, due to their 
inexperience Agents made mistakes both in reading Indians and the land which led to the 
waste of money and energy.
* D.M. Riordan to Secretary o f  the Interior, 12 May 1883, #9378, Box 138, Letters Received (LR), RG 75, 
NA; the first money allocated for water development on Indian land was in 1867 for the Colorado River 
reservation, Janet McDonnell, The Dispossession o f  the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1991), 71.
 ̂ Underhill, The Navajo, 169; for the bungling efforts o f  the Indian Irrigation Division o f  the Indian Service 
see Donald J. Pisani, “Nationalizing the Waters,” “Uneasy Allies; The Reclamation Service and the Indian 
Office,” Chapter 7.
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The Navajo reservation was one of the first places that the Indian Service 
attempted reclamation. In the 1880s, agents worked hard on several projects. But they 
met with little success. The first was D.M. Riordan. He assured the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs that “there are a number of places on the [Navajo] reservation where an 
expenditure of a few hundred dollars would render large tracts available for farming in 
the Indian manner.” He warned that this must be done soon, however, because gullying 
had cut away valuable farm land, leaving much of the area around Fort Defiance a “sandy 
waste.” If, however, he could get started right away he was confident that whatever he 
built would last for all time and provide such excellent results that the fears of the 
Commissioner of Indian would be put to rest. Too, Riordan requested that the Indian 
Service send a man out to inspect the reservation for other waterworks projects. He was 
optimistic about the possibilities of irrigation on the reservation and eager to get 
reclamation underway.^
Things started to go wrong almost immediately and it became clear that more 
than a few hundred dollars was necessary to build waterworks. The streambed in front of 
the schoolhouse at Fort Defiance, Riordan's original hope for a water source, had been 
cut to a thirty five to forty foot deep arroyo. Water could not reach as far as the 
schoolhouse; it all sunk into the sand far upstream. Where once Navajos cultivated fields 
was now sand deposited far down stream. The arroyo had become so entrenched that it
 ̂D M . Riordan to CIA, 23 April 1883, #8080, B ox 135, LR, RG 75, NA; Secretary o f  the Interior to D M . 
Riordan, 3 May 1883, #8259, Box 136, LR, RG 75,NA. The literature on gullying in the Southwest is best 
reviewed in Tuan, “N ew  Mexican Gullies”; also see William Denevan, “Livestock Numbers in Nineteenth 
Century N ew  Mexico, and the Problem o f  Gullying in the Southwest,” Annals o f  the Association o f  
Americatt Geographers 57 (1967): 691-703; and Luna Leopold’s examination o f  the literature on  
exploration in the Southwest as a tool for tracking vegetation change is quite useftil, “Vegetation o f  
Southwest Watersheds in the Nineteenth Century,” Geography Review 41(1951): 295-316.
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had eaten the surrounding fields. Riordan quickly shifted gears. After several scouting 
trips he settled on a spot a mile up from the agency headquarters in Bonita Canyon. He 
would let gravity deliver the water to the school. But the narrow canyon he intended to 
dam carried through it a stream so powerful that after a rain it “carried all the solid 
matter that water can.” Riordan did not seem to consider that this silt choked stream, the 
one that cut the arroyo in front of the school in the first place, could not be held back by 
the simple earth and log structure that he planned to build. Nevertheless, he estimated 
that he would have the dam up and working by July, 1883, in time to collect water from 
the rains of the monsoon season.^
As Riordan explored the canyons around Fort Defiance in April and May, 
Navajos who had been in the foothills with their flocks moved back into the valleys to get 
ready to plant. When the full moon of May came and the leafing of the aspens in the 
mountains, it was time to start farming. Around Fort Defiance, when Pleiades appeared 
in the night sky it was time to go to the fields and the natani, or local headman, declared 
it time to plant. During early June the Navajo needed to be in their fields to plant beans, 
squash, com, and muskmelons and watermelons. By the time warm weather set in stores 
from the winter were usually running low. It was imperative that they begin the annual 
planting. The Navajo had to have their crops planted by the beginning of July if they 
were to have a good harvest for the year. The only rain that they could rely on, in most 
years, came in July and August, thus if they did not have their com planted by early July 
they courted disaster.*
 ̂D M . Riordan to th« Secretary o f  the Interior, 12 May 1883, #9378, Box 138, LR, RG 75, NA.
* W.W. Hill, The Agricultural and Hunting Methods o f  the Navajo Indians, Yale University Publications in 
Anthropology (N ew  Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1938), 17, 26. Using Hill’s ethnography seems appropriate
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Riordan had not counted on any of this, and, thus, by June of 1883 he was not so 
sanguine. Frustration set in because he did not understand that the exigencies of living in 
the desert demanded that the Navajo get to work on their crops. To his mind, if the dam 
was built they would not have to rely on the capricious climate. But to the Navajo, the 
climate was anything but unpredictable. Indeed, success in agriculture was based on a 
strong command of the ritual surrounding it. The particulars of the climate any given 
year were far less important than the precise knowledge of ritual surrounding agriculture. 
The predictability and faithful application of ritual would insure a good crop. Clearly, 
then, the dam was far less important to the Navajo than it was to Riordan. But the 
Navajo were Riordan’s labor force and he had not counted on them being unavailable for 
work until mid-July. After all, he had not spent a summer in Navajo country yet. He was 
forced to wait.^
The Navajos belief that proper application of ritual would insure a good crop goes 
a long way to describe the crisis of 1890. Naturally, if they experienced year after year of 
poor crops and low rainfall, calling into question their faith would be a consequence of 
the drought. Seen in this light, Riordan’s efforts at dam building would have little effect 
on the Navajo if they believed that command of water was based on command of ritual. 
The permanent structure that Riordan wanted to build made no sense in a view of the 
world that was cyclic. Permanence, in the form of the dam, was arrogance. On a ritual 
level, the dam would subvert the annual agricultural rituals; on a more practical.
in this case because many o f  his informants were older men and women alive and well during the period in 
question. His monograph does not discuss the ages o f  his informants, but his notes at the National 
Anthropological Archives at the Smithsonian do provide this information. The Navajo did not move as a 
tribe, but rather as dispersed, discrete, clan based groups. The movement that I am describing occurred all 
over Navajoland; my description is something o f  a composite.
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everyday level, it made no sense. Floods would wash any dam out that could be built 
with present technology. Thus, the construction of a permanent dam was probably 
thought of a foolishness by the Navajo, if they gave Riordan s efforts any thought all. In 
any case, when Riordan turned to the Navajo to help him build the dam, they instead 
went to their fields.
At the beginning of July, Riordan’s plans took a series of blows. The dam had to 
be moved because Riordan mistakenly chose to build the dam on a base of quicksand. 
He found the ruins of several other dams and was determined that his would not meet the 
same fate. He soon located a spot further upstream. He envisioned a dam “forty two feet 
high when finished and if it stands one freshet will last as long as the Navajo tribe does.” 
(If Riordan’s prediction had been true they would have been doomed.) His estimate for 
the project climbed to $6,300, and he now hoped to have the dam ready for next season. 
But in the beginning of August, a flood raged through the narrow canyon, and washed 
away Riordan’s efforts, and probably enlarged the arroyo in front of the school. He asked 
for more money. Thus, between the spring and summer, the cost of the dam skyrocketed 
from a few hundred dollars to over $9,000.*®
That autumn the dam fell further into disrepair. In September, when the Navajo 
needed to harvest their com all else became secondary. And at the beginning of the new 
year, in October, food storage began in earnest. Harvesting was over, now it was time to 
get ready for the winter. Riordan, again, lost the bulk of his labor force. Flooding ruined 
the work in February, and by spring the dam was in a shambles. Riordan tried his best to
 ̂Hill, 52; D M  Riordan to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 15 June 1883, #10747, Box 141, LR, RG 75, NA.
D M. Riordan to C IA  3 July 1883, #12533, Box 145, LR, RG 75, NA; D M Riordan to C IA  27 
September 1883, #18191, Box 157, RG 75, NA.
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remain hopeful, but had a hard time masking his disappointment. Moreover, he was 
worried that if the school at Fort Defiance did not have a clean supply of water soon, one 
of the Navajo children would die. Whether he was overstating the urgency of the 
problem or not, I cannot say. What he was concerned with, however, was that if anyone 
perished in one of the school buildings then the Navajo would not go near it for fear of 
the spirit of the dead. Riordan realized that if he did not accommodate the Navajo’s 
belief system his life would be made that much harder. To a large extent the agent had to 
live on Navajo terms. After almost two years on the reservation, Riordan was finally 
starting to realize this. ' '
D M. Riordan lasted only a few months longer on the reservation. He tendered 
his resignation that summer and left. It is easy to be critical of Riordan; his many 
mistakes make him an easy target. But he oversaw a massive territory and got little help 
with the work at hand. He lived in squalor at Fort Defiance. He performed his job with 
unflagging dedication until the pressures of overseeing such a massive reservation 
became too much. Herbert Welsh, head of the Indian Rights Association, called Riordan 
“one of the most valuable officers employed in the Indian Service. He was a model 
Indian Agent, possessing qualities rarely united in one man.” Welsh’s comments are 
valuable because he was a well respected and influential shaper of Indian policy and 
reform in the late nineteenth century. To him, Riordan’s case was simply emblematic of 
the problem across the entire reservation system. “The Indian Agent is the pivot of the 
Indian problem. Upon him more than upon any one man rests the solution of the
” D M Riordan to CIA, 21 January 1884, #2017 and #2018, Box 173, LR, RG 75, NA; D M. Riordan to 
CIA, 10 March 1884, #4865, Box 179, LR, RG 75, NA; D M Riordan to CIA, 10 April 1884, #7384, B ox  
185, L R  RG 75, NA.
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question.” By forcing men such as Riordan out of the Indian Service—by having them 
live in horrid conditions and oversee vast territories alone—the Indians were the real 
losers, according to Welsh. But the ill conceived efforts of men like Riordan insured that 
the Indian Service, for the time being, had little influence over the Navajo. One man 
could not affect much change among thousands of Indians. But Welsh’s concerns were 
well founded. Riordan did not get much institutional support for his efforts, and, as we 
shall see, he was not the last agent to leave the Navajo reservation after only a short 
time,
John Bowman arrived in the summer of 1884 and started the cycle anew. 
Bowman, despite great plans for developing waterworks projects, lasted less than two 
years and saw none of his plans come to fruition. Like Riordan, Bowman thought the 
Navajo a strong, deserving people. He advocated the allocation of large amounts of 
money to be spent on developing water on the reservation. “These Indians are certainly 
the most deserving [in the region], both on account of previous good behavior, as well as 
their recent efforts towards helping themselves and advancing toward civilization. This 
tribe is now in the right mood and condition to make a long stride in the right direction.” 
If the Navajo could make one crucial evolutionary leap, the long stride, they would be fit 
to operate in the white world. Riordan had wanted to induce in the Navajo the spirit of 
competition in order that it might inspire in them a love of personal gain. Likewise, 
Bowman wanted to spend $20,000 on irrigation projects to develop individual 
farmsteads. The long stride that each man wanted the Navajo to make was the one 
toward love of personal property so cherished in white society. Bowman thought, like
Herbert Welsh, “Report o f  a V isit,. . 1 2 .
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many of his contemporaries, that Indians could be made over into whites in short order. 
He knew that it would be a lot of work. But it appeared that Bowman had not learned a 
thing from Riordan’s failures when he wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the 
best way to hold back water and build reservoirs was by ' erecting slight dams with plow 
and scraper, across some canyon or arroyo ’’ He soon learned that the slight dams he 
envisioned would be washed away by the first flood; what had not worked for Riordan 
would not work for him. Ironically, he conceded that a like number of white men would 
have a hard time wresting a living from this barren land.’^
Bowman was but a blip in Navajo history, but he represents a strain of thought 
that was prevalent among Indian Agents of the time. He believed that the Navajo were 
essentially a redeemable people. His attitude is representative of the optimism of the era. 
But Bowman, and his failures at reclamation also bear out the Indian Service’s continued 
reluctance to invest in waterworks.
Almost like clockwork, by the summer of 1886 there was a new agent, Samuel S. 
Patterson. Without fail, he set about to see what he could do about securing water for the 
Navajos. Patterson was the first Agent, at least explicitly, to attempt to use irrigation as 
social engineering. To be sure, both Riordan and Bowman before him advocated 
sedentary agriculture and wanted to instill a respect for private property, but neither were 
as clear as Patterson in their reasoning.
Patterson banked on the hope that by developing springs the Navajo would stay 
close to the reservation. Reasoning that it would be better to remain in one place with
D  M Riordan to CIA, 27 September 1883,, #18193, Box 157, LR, RG 75, NA; John Bowman to CIA, 26  
August 1884, #16714, B ox 205, LR, RG 75, NA; John H. Bowman to C IA  10 October 1884, Box 211,
LR, RG 75, NA; for the redeeming qualities o f  private property see, Hoxie, A Final Promise. 19.
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permanent water than to wander about in search of springs, Patterson sought to shift the 
Navajos’ annual pattern of summering and wintering in different parts of their homeland. 
He wanted them to stay on the reservation. He concluded that, “the matter of scarcity of 
water in the summer and pasture in the winter is one cause of these Indians shifting about 
so much instead of having more permanent dwelling places as would seem better for 
them.” Oddly enough he was right. The Navajo did shift from place to place as the 
limits of a particular locale were stretched, or as the season demanded it. But it was not 
aimless wandering. The Navajo did hot simply pack up at any given movement and sniff 
out the country for water. (Indeed, in places around Lukachkai and in the Chinle Valley, 
most Navajo practiced sedentary agriculture, only placing secondary interest in stock 
raising.) When the Navajo new year began in October and the harvesting was completed, 
pinon nut gathering began as did the move to foothills to be near wood for the winter. 
Following this, depending on how early the winter set in, the Navajo would then move 
away from their fields to the winter hogans. The men would then leave to deer hunt, 
usually toward the beginning of November. They had good reason not to remain 
permanently in one location. Resources were scattered about Navajo country.
But Agents like Patterson saw their mobility as aimless wandering. Despite 
recognizing their reasons for moving—the matter of scarcity of water in the summer and 
pasture in the winter—he wanted them to stay put within the legal confines of the 
reservation. That appears to have been a goal equal to the respect for private property. 
The Navajo needed to learn how to respect the boundaries of the reservation. But as long
*'* Hill, 15-16; Samuel S. Patterson to CIA, 9 August 1886, #21697, B ox 328, LR, RG 75, NA; Patterson to 
CIA, I September 1886 and 2 September 1886, #23926 and #23927, Box 335, LR, RG 75, NA; White 
“Navajo Economy and Culture,” in The Roots o f  Dependency.
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as their herds continued to increase, and the drought continued to desiccate the land, the 
Navajo could not remain settled for the entire year in one place The debate over the 
perceived nomadic nature of the Navajo would he of great import in the coming years, 
Obser/ers of the Navajo continued to label them nomads even as they remarked on the 
importance of agriculture on the reser\'ation.
This was always the fatal mistake of the water planners in these early days: they 
recognized that the Colorado Plateau was semi-arid country', but they could not see that 
the Navajo had developed, over the centuries, strategies to deal with their environment. 
The agents’ plans to dam washes they found dry in the late spring and early summer, but 
that became torrents of rock and mud and water whenever rain or snowmelt coursed their 
way through them, were fatally naïve and based on scant experience in the region. The 
Navajo practiced floodwater farming where it was practical to do so, but never believed 
in the folly of building permanent structures. W.H. Code, twenty years later, 
characterized the work at Fort Defiance as a failure. He contended that Fort Defiance 
was the “point where probably more money has been expended in temporary/ work with 
less to show for it, than at any other school I have visited in the west.” Strong words 
indeed from the chief engineer.'^
These three agents of the 1880s were sure that the Navajo were quite capable of 
evolving into modems. They believed in the innate ability of the Navajo to progress; 
they did not buy into rigid racial determinism, but rather they were part of a new 
generation of reformers and agents who believed that through good works and example, 
Indians would survive and flourish into the next centuiy'. But they did not last very long
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and were able to affect little change. Too, the Indian Service was not yet ready to put 
such faith in waterworks projects, and, thus, they did not have the institutional support 
they needed. Conversion to the gospel of irrigation would have to wait until close to the 
next century. The Indian Service still considered these early projects ones done on a 
local scale and not part of a national plan.
The experiences of the agents in the 1880s, to an extent, discouraged much 
development in the nineties. But agents on the Colorado Plateau still batted about the 
possibilities of irrigation development in earnest. In 1889 the army sent Lt. John M. 
Stotsenburg out to Navajo country. Stotsenburg was detailed to the reservation to 
perform a reconnaissance mission in search of water. His lengthy report, written after 
more than two months spent in the saddle wandering the Navajo backcountry, was rich in 
detail regarding current Navajo farming practices as well as future possibilities.
Stotsenburg, like others before him and many after him, concluded that the 
Navajo were “stock raisers and to secure grass they wander about a good deal.” He went 
on, “In prosecuting the work 1 have learned that it is a matter of doubt whether the 
Navajo Indians would ever live on or farm the land after water for irrigation and stock 
was improved. It being merely a matter of fancy with them where they live and how long 
they will sojourn t h e r e . D e s p i t e  his reluctance to believe in their ability to stick with 
agriculture, he visited nineteen locations across Navajo country and found farms at every
W.H. Code to  the Secretary o f  the Interior, 6 September 1905, Box 109, General Correspondence (GC), 
Irrigation Division (ID), Series 653, RG 75, NA.
John M. Stotsenburg to the Adjutant General, Department o f  Arizona, 7 April 1889, 20 April 1889, and 6 
July 1889, B ox 209, SC 190, RG 75, NA. These several different versions o f  this report at the National 
Archives all appear to have the same contents. They appear to be copies o f  the original from April o f  1889 
1 am using contemporary spelling o f  names o f  places and people unless they appear in quotations, in which 
case I retain the original spelling.
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one. Too, he suggested developing water in places where Navajos had settled, “not 
because these were always considered the best but because several families had chosen 
these places as their homes and had farans or had done some work on them. They will 
work these place more willingly than elsewhere.” Clearly Stotsenberg could see that the 
Navajo did not merely wander the country; they did establish permanent, albeit seasonal, 
homes.
What clouded his vision, and led him to determine that the Navajo were only 
pastoralists, was the amount of cultivated land. That is, where the Navajo had eighty 
acres under cultivation, Stotsenburg dreamed of eight hundred. Too, the Navajo did not 
sell the produce from their farms, like they sold the wool from their sheep. His sights 
were set on the market, while the Navajo were content with a mixed subsistence 
economy of farming and stock raising.*’
The Stotsenburg report is fascinating and should be considered in brief detail. It 
is the first of its kind: a report solely for the purpose of investigating irrigation 
possibilities. It provides insight into not only Navajo farming, but white views on Navajo 
life, Stotsenburg, on the one hand, was a keen observer, but on the other, he was, 
unsurprisingly, myopic. For example, Stotsenburg characterized the Navajos that he 
encountered as unwilling to fool with permanent irrigation works. They were too lazy, 
he said, and unwilling to work. They lacked the industry to undertake such projects. 
But, without a hint of irony, he advised in his report against permanent irrigation works 
because “they would either wash out in a freshet or fill up [with silt] as they did at 
Washington Pass or Fort Defiance.” Laziness was not the concern; Stotsenburg warned
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the government against wasting money on futile projects. Where the government would 
be acting out of efficiency, the Navajo were merely lazy.’*
Where and when necessary, the Navajo had practiced flood water irrigation for 
centuries. In the Navajo origin story, after First Man and First Woman peopled the earth, 
their descendants began to farm utilizing a dam and an irrigation ditch. And evidence 
points to their prevalence across Navajo country. Indeed, it should come as no surprise 
that some form of water diversion would be needed in order to wrest a living in a 
semiarid landscape. Thus, when Stotsenburg claimed that the Navajo ‘have, as a rule, 
little or no idea of irrigation,” his comments took on a specious tone.’̂
But the Navajo may have been taking the agents for fools. His report implies, 
though he did not know it, that the Navajo took advantage of the agents. After 
advocating simple, impermanent structures—brush dams of the sort that the Navajo 
clearly knew how to use—Stotsenburg laments the fact that the Navajo were not 
educated in the ways of taking care of such structures. Whenever one threatened to give 
way all one had to do was throw a shovel full of dirt in and it was fixed, so he claimed. 
But the Navajo could not even do that. They preferred to sit back and watch the hard 
work of the agent go to waste, and then ride “fifty to a hundred miles to tell the Agent.” 
The agent, of course, was then compelled to come and rescue the poor Navajos who 
could not even use a shovel properly. Perhaps the agent, feeling sorry for Indians who
ibid.
ihtd.
19 On the Origin story see, Washington Matthews, Navajo Legends (Boston: Houhgton and Mifflin, 1897, 
Kraus Reprint ed., 1969), 70; on flood water farming and pre-historic and historic irrigation see, Kirk Bryan, 
“Flood Water Farming,” Geographical Review 19(1925):444-456, Esther Goidffank, “Irrigation Agriculture 
and Navaho Community Leadership: Case Material on Environment and Culture,” American Anthropologist 
47(1945); 267; Hill, 24-25; quote from Stotsenburg report.
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could not master such a simple operation, would bring food from one of the trading posts 
on the reservation.
Stotsenburg posed the obvious question; If they could not get a grasp of the 
concept behind a brush dam, then how could they be expected to be responsible for 
anything more elaborate or permanent? Of course, the evidence does not prove the point, 
but were the Navajo consciously playing dumb—surely they could fix a brush dam—just 
to waste the time of the agent? To what end would they try and play the agent in such a 
way? It does seem odd that rather than fix a structure with which they were surely 
familiar they would let it be washed away. It is possible that they did this merely to irk 
the agent. A more likely answer is that the small brush dams were inadequate or that 
they were built in areas Navajos did not favor for cultivation, thus they saw no reason to 
maintain them. Of course, this is difficult to prove. But Stotsenburg gave the lie to his 
own account. When inspecting the Chinle Valley, he advised against trying to dam 
Chinle creek with anything resembling a permanent structure. The creek shifted its 
course too much, thus making such a project impossible. Stotsenburg, again with no 
irony, suggested that the preferred method of taking advantage of the water would be 
with impermanent brush or dirt dams “as the Navajo do when they want water”! 
Obviously, then, the Navajo were familiar with irrigation.
This is not just a simple case of nineteenth century ethnocentrism. Stotsenburg's 
account should not be read as simply the account of one more misguided white man 
trying to do his best for the Indian. To be sure, it was that. But more importantly, it is 
instructive of Stotsenburg's utter blindness, and by association the blindness of the Indian
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Service. With no sense of contradiction or irony, Stotsenburg, in one instance, dismisses 
the Navajo as unable to grasp the intricacies of irrigation, but then suggests that in 
developing waterworks that the Indian Service follow the lead of the Navajo. Again, as 
when Peterson realized that the N avajo country was conducive to transhumance—surely 
not his word—and that the Navajo therefore had good reason to move around, 
Stotsenburg, too, could see that the Navajo had grasped how to utilize water in the desert. 
Both men admitted, Stotsenburg through his own contradictions, that the Navajo were 
indeed capable. But there was such an impenetrable wall of misunderstanding between 
them that nothing effective could be done. If in fact the Navajo were purposefully 
fooling the agents, and to me it seems likely they were, they were complicit in this 
morass of misunderstanding. For the time being, the size of the reservation— 
Stotsenburg, by his own admission, only saw a quarter of it—the lack of personnel, and 
the reluctance of the Indian Service to embark on any large-scale reclamation plans, kept 
waterworks projects to a minimum. The agent at Fort Defiance, C.E. Vandever, 
approved of the Stotsenburg report, only adding that he knew that even more families 
farmed on the reservation than Stotsenburg reported. But, nevertheless, Vandever felt 
that Stotsenburg was thoroughly qualified for the work and was pleased that the “[Indian] 
Department has chosen so efficient a gentlemen to perform this much needed and 
laborious task.” '̂
Stotsenburg was not alone in his vision to increase Navajo cultivation. In 1891 
John Wesley Powell, at the time heading both the Bureau of Ethnology and the U.S. 
Geological Survey, identified no less than 250,000 acres of potentially irrigable land in
20 Ibid
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
the Chinle Valley alone, and in the northern part of the Reservation, along the San Juan 
River, he proclaimed that 35,000 acres was irrigable land. Powell was enthusiastic about 
the possibilities for reclamation on the Navajo Reservation. He was confident that,
opportunities for water storage and irrigation are to be found in numerous 
places. The topography of the country throughout is favorable to the location of 
reservoirs among the head-waters of the various streams ...All of these canyons 
open out ultimately on broad plains and valleys, covered with rich deep soil, 
which is at present covered with a dense growth of sage brush giving evidence of 
its fertility .- The reservoirs can usually be constructed at comparatively little cost, 
as they will be located in canyons, and will usually require dams of but moderate 
length, the rock for the construction of which can be blasted out of the sides of 
the canyons at the dam sites."
But Powell’s enthusiasm for developing the San Juan River area and others on the 
reservation waned when he learned that only $10,000 had been appropriated for irrigation 
in 1891. That would not be sufficient to build the kind of waterworks that Powell 
envisioned; only a large dam could hold back the San Juan River and make it a profitable 
venture. All the waterworks that Powell envisioned for the reservation were large 
projects, just the type that the Indian Service was not prepared to undertake. Powell was 
familiar with the Stotsenburg report and favored his approach: the development of small, 
local projects. If there was not the will or the money really to reclaim the reservation, 
then small works would have to do for the time being."^
This kind of vision for the San Juan River country was not limited to Powell. By 
the time Powell weighed in on the idea of reclaiming the San Juan, the Indian Service 
had hired James Francis as an Additional Farmer. Francis, and others in his position 
across the West, oversaw farming in select farming districts, rather than overseeing an
C.E. Vandever to CIA, 3 May 1889, #12367, Box #209, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
John Wesley Powell to  CIA, 6 February 1891, 11 November 1891, #4962, B ox 209, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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entire reservation. Francis was a little less grandiose than Powell, but he, too, believed 
that farming would redeem Indians. Francis was convinced that the construction of 
waterworks on the reservation would forever end nomadic ways,̂ "̂
Visions like those of Francis and Powell would have to wait until the twentieth 
century, when the will existed to attempt large-scale projects. Throughout the remainder 
of the 1890s, agents concerned themselves with only a few minor irrigation projects. 
They mostly fretted over what to do with off-reservation Navajos. Turning Navajos into 
farmers took a backseat to solving the range problem. However, this only amounted to so 
much talk. During the nineties grass became scarcer and scarcer as drought and 
increases in population—Navajo, Anglo, and animal—began to take their toll. As whites 
moved into the area in ever greater numbers, Navajos living on the public domain 
became something of a nuisance and the source of many complaints. Developing water, 
then, became a way to tiy to keep the Navajo on the reservation. Again, the lack of a 
cohesive policy kept waterworks projects from ever really going beyond impotent efforts.
Still primarily considered wandering nomads, the Navajos who lived off the 
reservation, in particular, needed to be corralled along with their sheep. In 1890, the 
Indian Office instructed C.E. Vandever that his primary duty was to “immediately take 
energetic and proper steps to keep the Indians... within the limits of the reservation and to 
return roving Indians to the reservation.” Vandever did not need to be told of the friction 
developing between the white cattlemen and the Navajo; he was fully aware of the 
potential for a violent clash. He was largely sympathetic to the plight of the Navajo and
”  C.E. Vandever, Indian Agent to CIA, 3 May 1889, RG 75,19A, SC 190, #12367, Box 209; John Wesley 
Powell to  the Secretary o f  the Interior, 24 November 1891, RG 75, NA, SC 190, #42406, Box 209  
James Francis, Additional Farmer to CIA, 29 December 1891, RG 75, SC 190, NA, #1193, Box 209.
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had little tolerance for cowboys whom he termed “by-product[s] of civilization.” Despite 
his disdain for the “bloodthirsty man midwives,” Vandever knew that something had to 
be done. And, despite encouraging signs that the Navajo were developing respect for 
private property and permanent homes, Vandever still worried that the task of making 
them understand “our scheme of restricted land holding” would be near impossible. 
Only if sufficient water could be developed would the Navajo remain on the reservation 
and stave off the impending tempest.
The Indian Service began to see that irrigation might have possibilities on a large 
scale. In 1891, $200,000 was allocated for the Crow reservation and $30,000 for a 
general water development fund. For the next several years the Indian Service allocated 
between $30,000 and $40,000 for general projects, and, of course, maintenance and 
continued construction on the large Crow project. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. J. 
Morgan, supported the irrigation efforts. But he realized that expert guidance was 
necessary. “I am... of the opinion that the money could be expended to better advantage, 
if the appointment of a competent engineer to superintend the work were authorized by 
law.” Although the Indian Service was beginning to be converted to the gospel of 
irrigation, professionalization was still a long way off. But Morgan’s interest in irrigation 
led to another survey of the Navajo reservation, this time in 1892.^  ̂ The U.S. Army still 
led the effort. And, again, it was a reconnaissance mission; no work was done, just 
information gathered concerning where irrigation and stock water development would be
“  ARCIA, 1890, 164-165; ARCIA, 1892, 125, 579; A M Stephen, “The Navajo,”
Anthropologist 6  (1893, old series), 349, 362.
“  Condition o f  the Navajo Indian Country, 52™* Cong., 2'“* Sess., 1893, S. Ex. Doc. 68, Serial 3056, 1-50.
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profitable. Too, the continued drought had left the Navajo in worse condition than they 
had been in years, according to the agent.
The crux of the matter was keeping the Navajo on the reservation. And water 
development was the way to do it. Nomadic Indians were a menace; they were a danger 
to both themselves and the grovsnng white population. The Pueblo Agent even 
complained about wandering Navajos. It seems that they were grazing on Zuni lands and 
the Agent was worried about potential violence. Now, the Indian Agents on the ground, 
and the Commissioner in Washington, both came to see that irrigation could greatly aid 
their situation. Irrigation development would foster sedentary farming, and stock water 
development would curtail seasonal movement in search o f  water and grass. The 
redoubtable C.E. Vandever, ever optimistic, said that “this method would tend to cure the 
roving habits of the Navajoes [sic] and advance them in civilization... If this tribe is to be 
restrained within the reservation, all the portions available for agriculture must be made 
productive.” *̂
But tension always existed between those who wanted water developed solely for 
stock and those who believed farming was best. Clearly, Vandever and James Francis, 
the Additional Farmer, had faith in farming. In 1894, however, the Indian Service hired 
its expert, an engineer from Staunton, Virginian, E C. Vincent. He agreed that farming 
would work wonders for keeping the Navajo in one place, but owing to the topography of
”  On the allocations see ARCIA, 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896; quote from ARCIA, 1892, 92; 
on the drought and condition o f  the Navajo see, ARCIA, 1893, 1894. But these reports should be taken 
with a grain o f  salt. C.E. Vandever was replaced by E H  Plummer in 1893, and Plummer had a wholly 
different outlook on the friture o f  the Navajo. Where Vandever saw progress, Plummer found backwardness 
and hopelessness. Two such varying impressions speak as much to actual condition o f  the Navajo as they do 
the suspect nature o f  the agents’ reports.
ARCIA, 1892, 581; N  S, Walpole to CIA, 22 November 1898, #53471,Box 102, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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the reservation it was a folly ever to think that much of the reservation was cultivable. 
Despite his disbelief in fanning he did construct several reservoirs designed to irrigate 
crop lands. Vincent’s reluctance to bank on farming came, again, from the common 
perception that the Navajo were aimless wanderers. To Vincent, on the reservation for 
just a year when he submitted his report, the Navajo were not cut out to be farmers. “He 
inherits love of leisure from his ancestors. He wants neither care, work, nor 
responsibility. His easygoing, shepherd life is far more to his like than farming.” 
Vincent went further to say that the nomadic life had caused much strife among the 
Nav^o. He averred that their holding water sources in common for stock had led to a 
“survival of the fittest” mentality Only the strongest would get the proper amount of 
water for their sheep. And nomadic life, of course, meant that the Navajo had no 
permanent homes; home was merely a matter of where one found oneself at day’s end.^^ 
Vincent shared with agents in later years, as we shall see, a desire to increase 
stock on the reservation. There was en o u ^  water available, if it could be developed 
properly, to insure the growth o f the herds. Farming was never going to work to any 
great extent on the reservation, according to men like Vincent. But often the left hand 
seemed not to know what the right hand was doing. In the same Annual Report, the 
agent reported that, again, the Navajo had suffered terrible losses of stock due to drought 
and a particularly hard winter. He emphasized concentrating on farming; stock raising 
was too mercurial an enterprise! According to the agent, Vincent was unfit for the task, 
and the money that the Indian Service allocated for waterworks was going to waste. By
ARCIA, 1895, 25.
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the following year, 1896, E C. Vincent had been dismissed. And according to the agent, 
the “benevolent designs of Congress had not been accomplished.” ®̂
The above examples serve to illustrate the still very unprofessional manner in 
which the agents and the Indian Service went about getting water for the Navajo. E C. 
Vincent was hired finally to bring a modicum of expertise to the enterprise, but he proved 
unfit for the job. And conflicts existed between those who believed in farming as the 
solution or further stocking of the range. It really depended on the persuasion of the 
observer. Men like Vincent, a very recent transplant from the humid East, could not be 
expected to understand the exigencies of farming on the semiarid Colorado Plateau. To 
him, livestock was the obvious solution in what to him appeared to be a sea of grass. 
This caused immediate friction between him and the agent. Constant Williams, who 
believed that farming could work.
Waterworks projects on the Navajo reservation during the last twenty years of the 
nineteenth century never got beyond this stage of ad-hoc development. Vincent, the first 
professional to attack the problems, attempted to construct permanent dams at several 
places on the reservation. They met with the same fate as the earlier dams at Fort 
Defiance. Freshets washed away permanent structures. As the century closed, little had 
been accomplished on the reservation, save one thing: a greater sense of urgency 
regarding water development. The severe drought was not over. The Indian Service’s 
commitment to water development on the Colorado Plateau was not serious enough yet 
to affect real change. But with the new century, the Indian Service’s level of 
commitment to irrigation deepened and a cadre of professional engineers emerged to try
ARCIA, 1895, 118; ARCIA, 1896, 112-113.
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to solve the problems of water development on the Colorado Plateau. The Indian 
Service’s interest in irrigation did not, o f course, germinate in a vacuum. Throughout the 
1890s and into the first years of the twentieth century, irrigation became a much talked 
about solution for settling the arid West Irrigation could be employed to fulfill the 
American destiny of spreading out over the entire country; new lands, heretofore going to 
waste, could be made productive. Irrigation was not only a way to redeem Indians, 
making them productive members o f American society, but a way to redeem all of the 
West. With the passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902, the United States, on a national 
level, committed itself to large-scale waterworks. And the Indian Service jumped on 
board.̂ ^
Navajos, too, needed convincing of the sobering effects of civilization; they 
needed to see that what the white man had in mind was, indeed, better than their life of 
“wandering” the Colorado Plateau. But it would be hard to convince them of that at such 
a distance from civilization. And one agent could not hope to prove to the Navajo the 
benefits of white civilization. Additionally, white civilization at-largc needed to see that 
Indians were still, on the cusp of the twentieth century, largely frozen in time. Indians, 
since the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, had been trotted out by the government 
and put on display. But by the 1890s the ^^actice was as much for the benefit of the 
Indians as much as a show piece for white audiences. At the 1893 Columbian Exposition 
in Chicago, Indians from tribes across the country, “displayed” by either the Indian
For the development o f  irrigation ideology, albeit two disparate views, see, Donald Worster, Rivers o f  
Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f  the American West (N ew  York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), 1, 
189; Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a D ivided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 
(Albuquerque: Univ. o f  New M exico Press, 1992), 273-325. See the bibliography for contemporary 
accounts o f  the national irrigation movement.
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Service or the Bureau of Ethnology, were examples of, respectively, assimilable peoples, 
or examples of the country’s primitive past. The tension between the two representations 
is worth noting because the Navajo fit perfectly into both constructions; they were, on the
t
one hand, frequently characterized as the most fit and able Indians, or vilified as raiders 
and chastised for being wild, nomadic Indians. Thus, they could be models of 
assimilation or examples of the primordial past. In the twentieth century this tension 
would have to be eased; one or the other interpretation would have to prevail. The 
country was ready to shed the skin of the past and Indians who represented that past 
needed to be shucked off with it.^^
The object lesson of Chicago traveled a two-way street. White America could get 
a glimpse of either Indians on their way to civilization or Indians from a time now, 
thankfully, gone. But Indians, too, could see for themselves what white America was 
like. Several Navajos went to the fair, at the expense of the Indian Rights Association, in 
Hosteen Deete Sahghy’s words, “for the whites to see and [for the Navajos] to see the 
whites.” The fair seemed to work the appropriate magic on the three Navajos from 
whom we have accounts; they were singularly impressed with what they saw on their 
journey. The white world was, indeed, better than the Navajo. All the way to Chicago 
the Navajos could see that the “white people were taking care of the earth... .Look at our 
country; we ought to be ashamed o f it. Look at the difference.” The white world was 
managed for the benefit o f the people, Hosteen Bagota seemed to be saying, whereas the 
Navajo world was laying in waste. And without doubt one lesson the trip was designed 
to instill in the Navajo was the white way of farming. As they traveled across the
Hoxie, S8-89.
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Midwest to Chicago the farms along the way impressed them, as did the amount of work 
whites put into their farms. ‘They don’t lay around in the sun; they work all the 
time. . The Indians looked to see how it is done; how the white people do the work. We 
seen for all the Navajoes (sic].” Indeed,, they had. By all accounts, if we are to take these 
testimonies literally, the Navajo had been convinced of the value of white civilization.^^
In the early twentieth century, the Indian Service began to take reclamation on 
Indian reservations seriously. But as they did so, the Navajo were not the only Indians on 
the Colorado Plateau who were in need of waterworks. Their neighbors, the Zuni, long 
neglected by the Indian Service, came under close scrutiny. Before exploring the parallel 
history of Navajo and Zuni irrigation development, a brief examination of Zuni is in 
order.
/VRCIA, 1894, 1044-1045. More than these three Navajos went to Chicago, but it is their testimonies that 
were recorded.
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TRADITIONAL ZUNI AGRICULTURAL AREA
* 1VH5 by th« untvcrsiiy v( OkJthonia i'rcM
From Waffle Gardens to the Blackrock Dam: The Zuni Reservation, 1883-
1900
From a distance of more than a century it is easy to look back in amusement at 
agent Ben Thomas’s request for sixty dollars to sink a well on the Zuni reservation to 
provide them with water enough to fulfill their needs. The astigmatism that we 
experience glancing back in time is probably less profound than the myopia Thomas 
suffered as he observed the Zuni from a fair distance himself: the agent in those days was 
stationed in Santa Fe and had little or no contact with the Zuni. It is likely that when 
Thomas requested the money he had never set foot at Zuni. His vision of what the Zuni 
needed was clouded indeed. More realistic, but still way off the mark was the plan of the 
teacher and missionary at Zuni, J.H. Wilson. Where the Zuni River narrows just north of 
the main village, as it flows through black lava rocks, was the ideal spot for a dam, 
Wilson thought. Wilson estimated that the dam could be up and running, built with local 
supplies and cheap Indian labor, at a cost of eight hundred dollars. The reservoir that 
would form behind the dam would supply water for 8000 acres of farm land and would 
“render fertile and valuable a tract which otherwise is almost barren and useless.” 
Perhaps the Zuni would then see the value in such projects and be encouraged to build 
them on their own. As was the hope of Indian agents in those days, they would lead by 
example and the Indians would follow. Additionally, the Zuni would have so much 
leisure time when their dam and ditches were finally built that they could enjoy the 
reservoir as an aquarium! Wilson’s enthusiasm was palpable. But he really did not know 
what he was doing, nor did his “expert engineer,” Douglas Graham, the local trader. As
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of 1883 the railroad had not yet reached Gallup, forty miles north of Zuni, and the project 
was put on hold due to lack of materials and labor. ‘
Throughout the late 1870s and the early 1880s, the boundaries of the Zuni 
reservation were not entirely clear. Determining the needs of the Zuni-=hovv much land 
would be adequate for farming and stock raising—was pressing business for the Indian 
Service. The land grant that they had received from the Spanish was contested and white 
settlers were moving into the region, threatening Zuni title. The Zuni’s water needs were 
an important feature of the these discussions. The three villages that the Zuni tvent to 
each year to farm were essential for their well being—they included the most reliable 
water sources. Thus, keeping them part of Zuni land became an important feature of 
working out the boundaries of the reservation. But also important was developing 
alternate sources of water. James Stevenson o f the U.S. Geological Survey, and husband 
of Matilda Coxe Stevenson, recognized, too, that the black lava rocks were the ideal spot 
for a dam Developing a dam at this location would enable the Zuni to cultivate more 
land near their “permanent” home of Zuni village. But Zuni village was not really a 
permanent home; it was more of religious center. The Zuni returned to the main village 
each year for Shalako and to spend the winter. Developing a dam to curtail movement 
between the villages would alter the Zuni’ annual schedule. But in these discussions 
regarding the boundaries of the reservation, the dam remained merely an idea. No work 
was undertaken to survey the site, much less begin construction. The ideas tossed about 
regarding reclamation at Zuni in the period before 1900 bore no fruit. The spot that the
’ B.M. Thomas to CIA, 17 November 1882, #21085, Box 109; 26 March 1883, #6033, Box 130, LR, RG 
75, NA; J.H. Wilson to B.M. Thomas, 26 March 1883, #6300, Box 131, LR, RG 75, NA; B.M . Thomas to 
CIA, 17 Apiil 1883, #7413, Box 134, LR, RG 75, NA
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dam would eventually go was picked, but this was a small achievement, indeed. The 
Indian Service appeared eager to build a dam, but the will was not there.'
Not far to the northwest, D.M. Riordan was echoing Wilson’s and Thomas’s 
enthusiasm at Fort Defiance. But like the projects at Fort Defiance, the Zuni dam was ill 
fated from the start. The Indian Service was not yet willing to get in the business of 
reclamation. At Zuni, serious discussion of the dam would have to wait another fifteen 
years.
After these stalled efforts, interest in reclamation projects at Zuni slacked off. 
They did herd sheep, but never in the numbers that the Nav^o did; thus the main concern 
at Zuni was not keeping wandering nomads in place. On the contrary, the Zuni were 
settled agriculturists who lived in permanent homes in four very distinct Pueblos—Zuni, 
Ojo Pescado, Ojo Caliente, and Nutria. The nexus o f activity was Zuni, while the other 
three served as seasonal agricultural villages. While at Navajo, agents would not readily 
accept Navajo agriculture; at Zuni agriculture and irrigation went hand in hand and had 
done so before the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. The most common 
type was floodwater irrigation. The Zuni built check dams, diversionary dams, and small 
mud walls around their fields, all in an effort to guide water from the intense summer 
storms and run-off from snowmelt Around Nutria, Ojo Pescado, and Ojo Caliente, there 
were permanent springs, and diversion ditches were constructed to direct water onto the 
fields. A third method Of farming was also practiced: the waffle garden. Zuni women 
constructed small, waffle like embattlements around individual plants to conserve water.
 ̂“Zuni Indian Reservation in N ew  M exico and Arizona,” Ex. D oc . #11, 48*  C o n g , 2*** Sess., 1884, James 
Stevenson to the Secretary o f  the Interior, ? April 1884. This is a twenty-nine page collection o f  letters and 
executive orders referring to llie boundary problems on the reservation.
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This was normally done close by the Zuni River in order that water could easily be 
brought up by hand and deposited on individual plants. In the large fields watered by 
floodwater irrigation the Zimi grew com, while in the smaller waffle gardens, specialty' 
crops like onions, peppers, squash, and pumpkins were cultivated. The Zuni laid in crops 
for the coming year in order to prevent shortages.'
Throughout the 1880s and 90s, while the Indian Service worked furiously, but to 
little avail at Navajo, the Zuni did not even have their own agent. And irrigation works 
were not the first priority of the Indian Service. But by the late 1890s irrigation 
development was, again, considered; this time the idea was here to stay. Drought on the 
Colorado Plateau forced the Indian Service to reconsider reclamation. The discussions 
that took place in the late 90s on the Zuni reservation resembled those of the early 80s at 
Fort Defiance. It was as if a loop tape had run its course ahd was being played again. 
The Zuni, like the Navajo before them were now found wanting. According to the 
accounts of the agents in the area and the Indian inspectors who came through the 
reservation, the Zuni anxiously awaited a dam. “They are very poor and their means of 
subsistence very limited, owing to the lack of water upon their lands....[T]hey are veiy 
anxious to have their lands irrigated” noted Indian Inspector Duncan. Tire bulk of the 
Zuni’s time was “taken up with prayer and offerings to the god of rain. This dam would 
obviate all this distress.” The time was ripe to undertake such a project. Both Duncan
 ̂ARCIA, 1898, p. 211, “Report o f  the Field matron in Zuni Pueblo”; Vorsila Bohrer, “Zuni Agriculture,” 
E l Palacio 67(1960), 181-202; Bryan, “Flood-Water Farming”, Frank Hamilton Cushing, Zuni Breadstuff 
(N ew  York: The Heye Foundation, Museum o f  the American Indian, 1920); Matilda Coxe Stevenson, 'the 
Zuni Indians, 23"* Annual Report o f  the Bureau o f  American Ethnology (Washington, D C  GPO, 1915), 
351-354; Karl A Wittfogel and Esther S. Goldfrank, "Some Aspects o f  Pueblo Mythology and Society,” 
Journal o f  American Folklore .56(' )̂, 21-22; T ,1 Ferguson and F Richard Hart A Zuni Atlas (Norman 
Univ. o f  Oklahoma Press, 1985), 37-39.
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and the agent for the Pueblo and Jicarilla Agency, N.S. Walpole, had heard rumors that a 
dam had been discussed before, but for some reason had not been built. Duncan 
confessed to having no way of finding out whether this was true or not, but he and 
Walpole believed that $10,000 had already been allocated for a dam. Of course they 
were referring to the ill fated dam discussed in the early 1880s at Zuni.'*
The dam at Zuni, which would become knows as the Blackrock Dam, was widely 
discussed in the late 1890s, A C. Tonner, the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs, forwarded 
Inspector Duncan’s report to the Secretary of the Interior and advised that another, more 
detailed inspection be made of the reservation. In 1899 Walter H. Graves was dispatched 
to the Southwest to make a wide raging inspection of many reservations and the water 
conditions upon them In the report that Graves filed with the Secretary of the Interior he 
found all of the Pueblo Indians in dire shape; they were living on the farthest margin of 
existence. San Ildefonso Pueblo had not been able to grow crops for the last few years 
owing to old, decrepit ditches. They had been forced to sell “their crude pottery” and 
take what work they could get. He found similar conditions at all the Pueblos. But Zuni, 
with the largest population, was in the worst shape of all.^
Graves found the ceremonial life of the Pueblos fascinating, and he blamed it, in 
part, for their piteous conditions. The Pueblo Indians seemed to devote all of their time 
to “supplicating or propitiating some of their innumerable Deities for rain or favorable
N.S. Walpole to CIA, 22 November 1898, #53471, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Report o f  Inspector 
Duncan in A  C Tonner, CIA to the Secretary o f  the Interior, December 12 1898, #50177, Box 212, SC 
190, RG 75, NA; B.M. Thomas to CIA, 17 April 1883, #7413, Box 134, LR, RG 75, NA.
' Walter H. Graves to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 24 November 1899, #57989, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, 
NA.
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weather.” He hoped that the energy spent in their ceremonial pursuits could be redirected 
to fruitful labor.
The time and effort consumed in the ceaseless and bewildering rites and 
ceremonies of these people—believed to be essential to secure the little moisture 
that is necessaiy to pull through their meagre [sic] crops—if properly applied with 
sufficient water for irrigating their lands, would produce enough to supply their 
wants and more.^
The ceremonial schedule of the Pueblos, especially Zuni, became a constant source of 
irritation and befuddlement for engineers and agents to come. Rain came each year, but 
the quality of the rain was dependent on the “generosity of the proper Deity,” according 
to Graves. The rain might be too violent one year and come all at once, or be unevenly 
distributed, but with a dam the generosity of the gods would no longer be a concern.
But a dam could not replace religious ritual. The tension between ritual and work 
thus became almost palpable. The ceremonial life of the Zuni, designed in large part 
around insuring sustenance through understanding and paying heed to the seasons of the 
year, could not be subverted overnight. Where the inspectors and agents saw chaos and 
disorder in ritual—a waste of time and energy—the Zuni were trying to wrest order from 
their world. Agents and engineers wanted to reorder the Zuni world, but in the disorder 
of ritual, the Zunis possessed precious autonomy from the white world. In fact the dam, 
per se, was not an issue with the Zuni, but attempts at altering religious life posed a real 
affront. Indeed, Governor Chaves of Zuni said, after construction had been underway for 
several years, that the dam was welcome, but efforts at changing Zuni religious practices 
were strictly forbidden. Religion was the one realm of the Zuni world that was off limits.
' ihid
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As Governor Chaves asked, “How can a man be a man and have two religions?” The 
dam could be seen as a way to subvert religious life. If it were there to obviate the need 
for the bewildering canon of religious practices that the Zuni engaged in, then it was 
designed to undermine Zuni religion. And in that case, the Zuni would not tolerate it. As 
long as they could work on the dam at a pace that was guided by their ceremonial and 
agricultural life, then all was well. But as soon as labor demands got in the way of 
religious obligation there was a problem, a clash of values. John Harper did not like it, 
but nonetheless understood that for their “innumerable dances and ceremonies...they will 
stop anything.”^
The 1880s and 90s were not years o f great activity on the Zuni reservation 
regarding waterworks. The Indian Service was busy with the Navajos. But after the turn 
of the century, the Indian Service shifted focus away from the Navajos and redirected 
their energy into the Blackrock Dam. In the first decade and a half of the twentieth 
century, the Indian Service made up for the lack o f attention they gave the Zuni in the 
late nineteenth century. The work at Zuni, in fact, eventually took precedence over all 
other work and the Navajo irrigation efforts would fall into disrepair. Very quickly in the 
early years of this century irrigation became one of the main features of Indian Service 
policy on the Colorado Plateau. It is to that complicated time that we now move.
’ A C Tonner, CIA to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 13 December 1898, #50177, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, 
NA; Walter H. Graves to  the Secretary o f  the Interior, 24 November 1899, #57989, Box 212, SC 190, RG 
75, NA; Matilda Coxe Stevenson to  William Henry Holmes, 25 February 1907, MCS file. Box 6, NAA;
John B Harper to CIA, 8 August 1906, #69742. B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA. I borrowed the notion o f  
autonomy in disorder from Mart Stewart’s insightful essay on, among other things, how slaves ordered their 
world under the attempted control o f  their masters on Georgia rice plantations. Mart Stewart, “Rice, Water, 
and Power: Landscapes o f  Domination and Resistance in the Lowcourriry, 1790-1880," Enviwnmentai 
Hisioiy Review 15(1991): 47-64, 57.
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**This Thing of Having Your Work Depend on the Whims of Ignorant Savages Is Not 
As Pleasant As It Might Be”: Reclamation on the Zuni and Navajo Reservations,
1900-1914
The gulf that separates reclamation efforts in the twentieth century from those in 
the nineteenth is vast. If an engineer working in 1905 were somehow able to travel in 
time back even as recently as the 1890s and hire on to one of the several Navajo 
reclamation projects he would be entering a different world. Waterworks projects were 
at such an inchoate state in the late nineteenth century that the experts of the twentieth 
would probably scratch their heads and wonder what it was the amateurs of the 
nineteenth were up to. When W.H. Code claimed that the efforts at Fort Defiance were 
among the biggest failures of the Indian Service, he did not direct his vitriol against the 
agents on the ground. Rather, his venom was reserved for the bureaucracy of the Indian 
Service. Because so little planning had gone into the projects, limited Indian Service 
funds had been wasted and reclamation gained for itself a bad name. By 1905, things had 
changed. Professionals, like Code himself, now worked for the Indian Service and its 
newly minted Irrigation Division. The amateurish world of the nineteenth century faded 
into the past and the professionalism of the twentieth took its place.
As the Indian Service embraced the gospel of irrigation—a new thing for the 
entire federal government—it had to construct the bureaucratic apparatus to 
accommodate large-scale waterworks projects. No longer would individual Agents be 
able to handle the demands of reclamation. The Indian Service hired its first two 
professional engineers, aside from the failed attempt in the 1890s on the Navajo
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reservation, in 1900; by 1905, a small cadre of engineers worked for the Indian Service. 
W.H. Code was the peripatetic first Chief Engineer and oversaw all of the work of the 
Irrigation Division from his headquarters in Los Angeles and on field inspections 
covering thousands of miles of the American West. Additionally, the Irrigation Division 
broke the West into five irrigation districts and the Navajo and Zuni reservation fell into 
District 5, which included New Mexico, southern Colorado, Utah, and northern Arizona. * 
As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, and the Indian Service made 
the shift to professional reclamation efforts, a new era began. Gone were the simple 
attempts of the previous twenty years when agents operated under conditions of relative 
drought, constructing minor projects. By the turn of the century, plans were made for 
major waterworks on Indian Reservations in the Southwest and elsewhere. As the water 
engineers and Indian agents entered the new century, they did so having learned few 
lessons fi'om the past. They attempted projects that were larger and more expensive than 
had ever been contemplated. As a result of having captured little or no information about 
regional climate variation, they failed to consider possible environmental changes. 
Drought was all they could imagine. Too, Indian labor was relied upon for constructing 
these massive waterworks. While the Irrigation Division hoped for a cheap and docile 
labor force, what tliey got were discrete cultural groups operating on somewhat related, 
but distinctly different, ceremonial and agricultural and hunting schedules. Where before 
the Indian Service discounted Indian knowledge on how to water the desert, they now 
expected their labor. But the ritual cycle of the Zuni was not going to be subverted in 
order to build a dam, nor was the Navajo grazing, hunting, and planting regime. The
' For a sketch o f  the basic structure o f  the Irrigation Division see, McDonald, The Dispossession o f  the
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change in climate at the local level and die cultural vitality of the Navajo and Zuni 
peoples conspired to dash many of the dreams of the Irrigation Division."
The history of reclaiming the Navajo and Zuni reservations gets more 
complicated as the Indian Service’s plans become grander and grander and their 
bureauacracy simultaneously grew. Appropriations for irrigation in the nineteenth 
century were a relatively simple matter; an agent either got the money or he did not. If 
$1,200 was allocated for reclamation on the Navajo reservation, it was not taking away 
from money that could have been spent at Zuni. Before there was an irrigation budget, 
money eidier came out of general reservation allocations or were special outlays based on 
the merits o f each case. More importantly, the amounts doled out were small. Not so in 
the twentieth century; yearly budgets in the hundreds of thousands of dollars became 
common. And by 1911, the Indian Service was spending more than $1 million on 
waterworks. As the first decade of the new centuiy wore on, the Irrigation Division 
began to become more concerned with the investments they had made than they were 
with reclaiming land for Indians. The amount of money that was spent on the Zuni dam, 
for example, led the Irrigation Division to try to protect that project rather iliau more 
evenly distributing funds to all projects on the Colorado Plateau.^
With a general and very finite budget the Irrigation Division had to decide on the 
relative merits of particular projects. Now, money spent one place was money not spent 
another. Projects in District 5, all operating from the bumc budget, essentially competed
American Indian, 75-76.
 ̂Pisani, Nationalizing the Waters, chapters 7 and 8; for importance o f  religion in the Pueblos, see Dozier, 
The Pueblo Indians o f  North America, 90, 104-105
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for funds. Engineers working on local projects submitted their budgets to the Chief 
Engineer, who then submitted them to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and on down 
the line to the Congress. Larger projects, of course, got more money, but as we will see, 
often to the exclusion and neglect of smaller ones. On the Colorado Plateau, the Navajo 
and the Zuni projects were at the mercy of this system. The Indian Service spent in favor 
of the Blackrock dam, in terms of money, energy, and expertise, and this led to the 
neglect of the Navajo. As the Irrigation Division worked to build the Blackrock dam and 
control the flooding that was destroying it, they ignored circumstances on the Navajo 
reservation. As discussed in the Navajo chapter, the Indian Service was vexed constantly 
by the question of whether the Navajo were fit for farming or were purely pastoralists. 
The developments in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century settled the 
debate. As spending went way over budget on the Zuni dam, and welter years visited the 
Colorado Plateau, the Irrigation Division determined that the Navajo were indeed 
stockraisers and money spent on irrigation projects was money wasted.
The projects on the Navajo and Zuni reservations became so intertwined that their 
history, in some respects, is a common one. To be sure, circumstances were peculiar to 
each project, but they were both affected by the change in the weather and the shift from 
amateurism to professionalism in the Indian Service. Shortly after construction began the 
Blackrock Dam started to soak up such a large portion of the resources of the Irrigation 
Division of the Indian Service that each year little was left for other projects. In 1908, 
W.H. Code asked for an extra $25,000 to be added to the appropriation for Indian
 ̂House Doc. #203, 62*** Cong., 2"̂  Sess., 1911, Serial 6324, p 2; for the cumulative costs o f  waterworks 
projects for the period in question see. Irrigation Projects on Indian Resenations Etc., House Doc. #1286, 
63"“ Cong., 3"* Sess,, 1914, Serial 6891; McDonald, 76-78.
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irrigation, to be used exclusively for the Blackrock Dam. He feared that if the extra 
money was not granted other irrigation projects in the area would suffer. That is, 
$25,000 would be spent on the Blakcrock dam regardless of whether or not Code got 
extra funds; he simply hoped that additional money would be found so that he could 
direct some of it towards the Pueblo and Navajo reservations. The Blackrock Dam had 
cost the government so much to date that Code thouglit it best to keep going and “not be 
stopped until sufficient lands are fully covered with a distributing system to afford the 
Zuni Indians a full opportunity along agricultural lines.” As more and more flooding 
wreaked havoc in the region, more and more money was pumped into the Zuni project. 
Eventually money was spent just to keep the project going and to justify previous 
expense. By 1910 $371,477.30 had been spent on the dam and it needed further repairs. 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs found himself “loathe to recommend further 
appropriations,” but was willing to do so “in order to protect the large sum of money 
already invested in the dam.” By siphoning off so many of the resources of the Irrigation 
Division, the development at Zuni contributed to, but did not cause, the 
underdevelopment at Navajo. The Irrigation Division, primarily because of John 
Harper’s obsession with Blackrock, neglected projects on the Navajo reservation.'*
The Navajo were the object of great scrutiny during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The Indian Service devoted much time and energy to transform them 
into settled agriculturists—to be sure, much of their energy was spent in ruminating on 
the possibilities that agriculture held for the Navajo and less in actual effort. But after
“* W.H. Code to  the Secretary o f  the Treasury, 14 November 1908, Irrigation System on Zuni Indian 
Reservation, 60th. Cong., 2"** sess., 1908, H. Doc. 1102, Serial 5556; Irrigation Systems on Indian 
Resen>ations, 5 December 1910, 61** Cong , 2""* sess., 1910, S. Doc. 689, Serial 5943.
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the Blackrock Dam, along with the Hogback ditch on the Navajo reservation, began to 
soak up all resources the Irrigation Division began to question whether or not the Navajo 
were suited to farming after all. Eventually, the Irrigation Division abandoned efforts at 
reclaiming the Navajo reservation for agriculture.^ The government decided to stock 
their range further with sheep and fully develop a pastoral economy. After more than a 
quarter century spent trying to turn the Navajo into farmers, the Irrigation Division 
decided that they were not agriculturists. It appeared easy for the Irrigation Division, 
once plans started to go awry, to reclassify the Navajo. Perceptions of them had, thus, 
turned 360 degrees. They went from being nomads to farmers and back again. The 
Navajo became, again, "wild" Indians.
As the Irrigation Division was making this decision, more and more instances of 
Navajo encroachmerit on Hopi land crept into the record. The “peaceful” Hopi need 
protection from the “wild” Navajo. Impressions made of the Navajo during the late 
nineteenth century eventually won out over efforts to turn them into farmers. And the 
events of the first decade and a half of the twentieth century—the climate change and the 
resultant failure of the Blackrock Dam—which led to the Navajo being reclassified as 
sheepherders resulted in the eventual overstocking of their range. When the Indian 
Service began to realize that the Navajo country could not be reclaimed on a large scale 
they took the recent wet conditions as an indicator of, again, normal climate. The wet 
years provided good forage for stock. In the first fifteen years of the twentieth century 
the Navajo range was stocked with more livestock than it had ever been before.
 ̂The Indian Service did attempt one other large project before World War I, at Ganado Charles S. 
Peterson, “Headgates and Conquest; The Limits o f  Irrigation on the Navajo Reservation, 1880-1950,” New 
Mexico Historical Review 68 (1993): 269-290.
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Increased pressure from off the reservation by non-Indian ranchers contributed to the 
decline in range quality. By the time the Navajo had, again, become purely pastoralists, 
conditions had changed.^
I am not suggesting that the Zuni necessarily benefited from the construction of 
the Blackrock Dam. Rather, the dam became the primary project in the region and all 
other waterworks projects were subordinated to it. The dam became the object of 
improvement and development, not the Zuni people. The lack of useful information 
collected in the nineteenth century led the Indian Service to attempt projects that they 
were unprepared for. The Indian Service never tapped their greatest resource for advice 
on how to live in the desert: the Navajo and Zuni people. This chapter, then, will be a 
joint history of the projects on the Navajo and Zuni reservations.
As discussed in the Zuni chapter, interest in irrigation rapidly picked up pace in 
the late 1890s. To the Indian Service, a dam was now an imperative. And by 1901 
surveys o f irrigation possibilities were well underway. Heading the effort was John B. 
Harper, the Superintendent of Irrigation on the Jicarilla and Pueblo Indian Reservations. 
Harper was in charge of irrigation efforts in the Pueblos, and eventually the Navajo 
Reservation, until his death in 1908. Throughout his tenure in the Southwest Harper 
never cared to understand Indians, nor did he like tiiem very much. He was constantly
® “Between 1893 and 1900 there was a precipitous decline in stock numbers followed by an equally rapid 
recovery between 1900 and 1915 that brought the total stock number to  their highest level since the Navajos 
were placed on the reservation.” Richmond and Baron, 219; see also Ian Cambell, “Climate and Overgrazing 
on the Shonto Plateau, Arizona,” Professional Geographer 22(1970): 137. Cambell posits that the 
overgrazing problem on the Navajo reservation was, indeed, a problem, but that climate as a factor, rather - 
than simply inelKcient Navajo shepherds, is too  often overlooked; on the increasing pressure from o ff the 
reservation and additional information on the stocking o f  the range see. White, 229-231 ; see also Lawrence 
C Kelly, The Navajo Indians atidFederal Policy, 7 9 0 0 -/9 i5  (Tucson: Univ. o f  Arizona Press, 1968): 104- 
114.
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vexed by their ceremonial life and he had little patience for “Indians who cannot tell one 
end o f a steel pipe from another.” But Harper possessed boundless amounts of energy 
and maintained unflagging dedication to the work at hand During 1901 Harper surveyed 
the Zuni Reservation, got to know the other Pueblos, and built a small ditch at San 
Ildefonso. He was keyed up about the prospects of irrigation development, and found the 
Indians grateful for the good work that he did^
Harper is one of the central characters in this story. No other individual had as 
much control over the projects as he, and no one was more obsessed with getting the 
Blackrock dam up and running. Harper’s impressions of the Zuni are some o f the most 
valuable that we have. He possessed none of the arrogance, or interest for that matter, of 
anthropologists and thus his characterizations of the Zuni, and the other Indians he 
employed, are the candid remarks of a man who worked with and lived with the Zuni for 
nearly eight years. He was not consciously observing them, but he needed to know the 
habits of the Zuni in order that he could be an effective supervisor. After all, he was their 
boss, of sorts. Although o f a different sort. Harper’s tenure among the Indians of the 
Southwest, and Zuni in particular, was just as valuable for insights into Indian history as 
those of some of his more famous anthropological contemporaries, among them Matilda 
Coxe Stevenson. Harper was not concerned with discerning the inner life of the Zuni or 
getting at the meanings behind their ceremonies. On the contrary, it seems as if he could 
have cared less, except for when Zuni religious life got in the way of work on the dam. 
And Zuni religious life frequently got in the way. Harper was a dedicated correspondent;
’ John B. Harper to CIA, 25 January 1901; 12 April 1901; 17 June 1901; 1 July 1901, Box 212, SC 190, RG 
75. NA, SC 190.
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his letters number in the hundreds. They are the basis of the history of irrigation 
development that follows; no other better chronicler exists.
After spending six months among the Pueblos, Harper concluded that the Zuni 
were most in need of a dam; according to him, they had the largest population and were 
the poorest. Harper provides the first intimations of the precedence o f the Zuni dam over 
other projects when he suggested that work in the other Pueblos be put on hold until the 
Zuni work could be finished. But until the Indian Service made firm plans for Zuni he 
had work to do in the other Pueblos and spent much of 1902 at Cochiti, Sandia, and Zia 
Pueblos. By the beginning of 1903 Harper had drafted formal plans for the Zuni dam. 
W.H. Code sent a report to the Secretary of the Interior in April, approving Harper’s 
suggestions, and in July $40,000 was allocated for the dam. Code confessed ignorance in 
several matters concerning the Zuni dam. He was most concerned with the fact that a 
gauging station had not been built at Zuni when the dam pwoject was first contemplated. 
Now only guesses could be made concerning the flow of the river and run-off from the 
mountains. Code was concerned that adequate data did not exist to determine whether or 
not they could fill a reservoir or even how big to make one. Nevertheless, both he and 
Harper calculated, based on the size of the watershed and the average of fifteen inches of 
rain per year, that the reservoir would fill six times during the year. But this would 
depend, Code admitted, on the “character of the rain storms.” Code counted on the rains 
that fell in July and August to be the principal source of surplus water for the reservoir. 
He did not consider the possibility of rains coming at different times of the year, greater 
than average snowpack, or the summer rains increasing in intensity. Plans were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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underway for the largest 'project yet contemplated on the Colorado Plateau with 
guesswork as the data.®
Harper spent the next year solidifying plans for the dam; by the summer of 1904 
woik had begun. And by August Haipci ran into what would be, along witli the weatiiei, 
one of the most intractable obstacles; problems witli. Indian labor. Tire “greatest 
difficulty [with constructing the dam is the] R eliability  of Indian labor.” Harper 
concluded that the Zunfs best attempt was but a poor imitation of real work. According 
to Matilda Coxe Stevenson, surmner solstice ceremonies began in tlie third week of June 
that summer—presumably they did each year—and the rain priests were occupied, as 
was much of the rest of the village, for the rest of the season. Despite the government’s 
promises to deliver water on a permanent basis, the dam was not built yet and the Zuni 
were still going to pray for rain. Reporting to Code that first fall, Harpei was stymied 
first by the Zuni who went to harvest; then by the Navajo who had been away all fall, 
variously “eating green com, then to harvest and now they are on a deer hunt.” Harper 
lamented that scarcely any work was accomplished owing to the dearth of Indians. In 
November, when tlie atmual Shalako dancing season began at Zuni, Harper found that 
work ground to a standstill until the following spring. By 1905 he liad learned the 
rhythm of the Zuni year, “In the spring they go out on their farms and stay until about the 
first of July, planting, shearing sheep & c , they then come in and want to work until 
September fiisl when the liatvesling and dancing begins again.” Each fall, as it became 
time to harvest or hunt, Harper counted on losing most of his workers; when Shalako
* John B. Harper to CIA, 12 July 1901; 14 April 1902; 12 August 1902; 10 August 1903, Box 212, SC 190, 
RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 13 April 1903, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; 
Thomas Ryan, Acting Secretary o f  the Interior to CIA, 22 July 1903, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA
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season started. Harper had to stop work entirely. Harper had reliable Indian labor, it 
seems, during a window of about two months during the summer. What the agents on the 
Navajo reservation had learned twenty years before. Harper was now learning; seasonal 
obligations—hunting, harvesting, and ceremony—would persist despite his plans to the 
contrary.^
Over the next several years Harper focused singularly on the Blackrock Dam, 
letting the calls of agents on other reservations go unheeded. As the work at Zuni slowed 
down in 1904, massive floods washed out the ditches that Harper had built at Cochiti and 
San Ildefonso. Along the northern border of the Navajo Reservation, on the San Juan 
River, flooding also washed out ditches. Samuel Shoemaker, Supervisor of Constructed 
Ditches and Special Disbursing Agent on the Navajo Reservation, estimated that the 
repairs to the ditches would run “high into the thousands.” And in the years to come. 
Harper rarely found time to tend to any problems besides the ones that he encountered at 
Zuni.̂ ®
The flooding that washed out the ditches at Cochiti and San Ildefonso signaled 
not only a new pattern of flooding in the region, but a new phase in irrigation history on 
the Colorado Plateau. At the beginning of 1905 Harper wondered if the weather would 
not curtail work on the dam to the point where little would be accomplished. And 
throughout that year. Harper commented on the “unprecedented storms and floods.” He 
wrote Code in May and said, “I have not tried to describe the conditions here for a long
 ̂Matilda Coxe Stevenson to  W. H. Holmes, 30 June 1904; 30 August 1904, Box 6, MCS file, NAA,; John 
B Harper to CIA, 31 August 1904; 7 November 1904, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to Code, 24 
October 1904; 29 November 1904; 30 November 1904, Box 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 27 
July 1905, #60861, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
Samuel Shoemaker to CIA, 29 October 1904, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA,
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time, not that language was lacking, but because it would sound incredible to anyone not 
experiencing it and particularly so to one familiar with the Southwest.” Harper worried 
on and off about the prospect of a “record breaking flood.” But by April he was 
confident that the Zuni watershed would not be affected by the storms and floods that 
wreaked havoc in the rest of northern New Mexico. He was shocked, then, in May when 
a flood raged through the Zuni River and did several thousand dollars worth of damage to 
the dam. But after the rains passed and the country was again dry, Harper felt sure that 
such weather was “not likely to be again encountered and I do not see that anything of 
future value can be gained by extending the discussion of it.” Despite Harper’s cavalier 
attitude, by the end o f the year he noted that winter storms started earlier and even though 
“it was hard to conceive that floods like those of last spring could be expected again this 
[coming] year” he predicted that they would. ̂  ̂
Harper’s reluctance to see the possibility of another destructive season of 
flooding does seem odd’ But, remember, to him the high rains of the year were an 
anomaly. His keen observations did not pick up on Zuni concern for the weather; he only 
mentioned that they disliked working in wet and cold conditions. Had weather like this 
visited the Colorado Plateau before, thus, this time, leaving the Zuni rather blasé? They 
probably knew that heavy rain in the late fall and winter would make for an auspicious 
spring: good crops and good wool from their sheep. One has to wonder, did the Zuni, 
like Harper, take the weather to be an anomaly or was it something they recognized? It is 
difficult to do anything but speculate
*' John B. Harper to W H. Code, 24 February 1905; 10 April 1905, GC, ID, Box 118, RG 75, NA; John B 
Harper to CIA, 3 May 1905, #36382, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to Code, 5 August 1905, GC,
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Harper was clearly concerned for the future of the dam. If the coming winter was 
a repeat o f the previous one, then real trouble could be expected. Because of Shalako 
and the coming winter storms Harper proposed calling work off until May. This was an 
extreme response to extreme conditions. Harper could not face another winter of storms 
and flooding. He warned Code that the weather must be considered now in planning the 
dam. The inference, o f course, is that the weather was not factored in until this point. 
Heavy rain was expected in the summer, but not in the winter months; He admitted as 
much; there was no precedent for this type of storming in the late fall and winter. 
“Without the gift of prophecy” Harper said he could not know what the weather would 
do, but another winter like the one of 1905 would ruin the work. C^ricious weather and 
Zuni religious life—contingencies not considered until they began to get in the way— 
were unraveling the Irrigation Division’s plans. Code, masking the seriousness of the 
problems encountered in the 1905, wrote the Secretary of the Interior that everything was 
under control, but admitted that “unforeseen contingencies” pushed the cost way above 
original estimates. It seems Code had to try to save face in front of the Secretary, but in 
the correspondence between him and Harper, fear for the future of the dam was evident.
In October, 1905 Harper raised the estimate for the dam to $100,000. And 
ironically, his misfortune led to Zuni prosperity. The rain of the past year had provided 
for good crops. The Zuni had no incentive to work on the dam. The same was true for 
the Navajo laborers whom he relied on: wool prices were high and thus there was little 
need to work. What was bad for Harper was good for the Indians. Not only the weather
ID, B ox 118 RG 75, NA; Harper to  CIA, 27 July 1905, #60861, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to  
Code, 1 December 1905; 31 December 1905, B ox 118, GC, ED, RG 75, NA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
itself stonewalled the work, but now the resultant good crops and Indian prosperity might 
stand in the way, too. Harper could not win.
During 1904 and 1905, along with the project at Zuni, the Irrigation Division 
again surveyed the Navajo Reservation, The story gets complicated at this stage. 
Between 1905 and 1914, the Navajo and Zuni Reservations would, in effect, compete for 
the finite resources of the Irrigation Division. The Irrigation Division attempted major 
projects on both reservations, the Hogback ditch on the San Juan and the Blackrock Dam 
on Zuni River. Floods plagued both projects, and costs escalated year after year.*'* As a 
result o f the limited resources available to the Irrigation Division, the engineers m # e  
decisions concerning the fate of the projects, and, hence, the fate of the Indians. John B. 
Harper’s singular focus fostered a cycle of neglect. After Harper’s death the Irrigation 
Division tried to play catch-up on the Navajo Reservation.
In 1904, as the work on the Blackrock Dam got underway, the Irrigation Division 
surveyed irrigation possibilities on the Navajo reservation. And W.H. Code hoped that 
the same mistakes that the Indian Service made in the past would not be repeated. This 
time, with a thorough survey of the reservation by professional engineers—not army 
officers or amateurs—the reservation might get reclaimed. And the San Juan river region 
in particular came under Indian Service scrutiny as a potentially productive agricultural 
area. John Wesley Powell’s vision of building a large irrigation project on the river
"  John B Harper to W.H. Code, 1 December 1905, B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to the 
Secretary o f  the Interior, 12 December 1905, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
"  John B Harper to W.H. Code, 10 October 1905, Box 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA,; Harper to Code, no 
date. B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
For detailed cost figures see H.F. Robinson, “Project Histories o f  the Pueblos o f  N ew  M exico,” 1913, 
Special Reports and Related Records, Series 657, Irrigation Division, Box 97, RG 75, NA; Annual District 
and Project Reports, 1909-1913, Series 655, Irrigation Division, District #5, Box 41, RG 75, NA.
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Started to take shape. The will to spend the money was now there. The San Juan River 
had traditionally provided good farming land for the Navajo, and George Butler, the 
General Superintendent of Irrigation, said that the San Juan was the best prospect for 
reclamation on the entire reservation. But recently, the ditches along the river had been 
neglected. Owing to a drought in the region, the Navajo left this portion of the 
reservation in search of work. And, as a result, the amount of farming done along the 
San Juan diminished. Too, the agent recognized that the drought was taking its toll on 
the Navajo’s herds. “On account o f the lack of sufficient rain or moisture in the hills and 
on the mesas the feed for sheep and goats...is becoming less and less abundant each year 
and makes this source o f their revenue very uncertain.” A solution was necessary.
W.T. Shelton, the agent at San Juan, fixed his sights upon what he saw as the 
untapped potential of the San Juan River. The Navajos living along the river had always 
taken advantage of its waters, but Shelton saw that the river had far greater potential. If 
the water now flowing through the San Juan could be handled properly, Shelton claimed 
that he could double the number of Navajo families now farming along its banks and end 
their nomadic ways. “It is my intention to encourage and assist the more intelligent of 
the mountain Indians, now depending entirely upon their herds, to take up and improve 
the farms along the ditches,” Once again, plans were being made to tame the “Free 
Riders of the Plains,” to settle them in permanent homes. Shelton’s faith in the Navajo 
led him to slough off offers of assistance from the Indian Service; only in the event of a
Samuel Shoemaker to CIA, 30 May 1904, #6043, Box 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; George Butler, Supt o f   ̂
Irrigation to C IA  24 June 1904, #55848, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to C IA  26 July 1904, 
#8039, Box 210, SC 190, RG 75, N A  W.T. Shelton, Supt. San Juan Training School to C IA  20 August 
1904, #58517, Box 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; George Butler to  C IA  24 June 1906, SC 190, B ox 210, RG 
75, NA.
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flood could the Navajo not handle the work. Shelton had been at the San Juan School 
only one year and was not used to the cycle of the river. The heavy rains that fell all 
across the Southwest in the fall of 1904 sent a freshet down the San Juan in October and 
ruined the ditches that he had worked so hard on. Consequently, at the beginning of the 
new year, the irrigation projects proposed by the surveys of the previous summer were 
now approved. The San Juan had demonstrated its power, not only for irrigation but for 
destruction. Unfortunately, the coffers were tapped and the plans would have to be put 
on a hold for the year.
A couple of brief, but salient, examples from the Rio Grande Pueblos will help to 
illustrate Harper’s obsession with the Blackrock dam and the neglect of other projects. 
As work progressed through 1906 on the Blackrock Dam, signals appeared at the Pueblos 
that Harper was not giving them their due—after all, he was in charge of projects in the 
whole region and this included the Pueblos. The floods that overflowed the Rio Grande 
and its tributaries in 1904 and 1905 left in their wake destroyed ditches at many of the 
Pueblos. C.J. Crandall, Superintendent of the Pueblo Agency, hoped that Harper would 
be able to visit Cochiti, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso Pueblos in the coming months to 
assess the damage and make recommendations for repairs. The situation was dire, for 
“many of the Pueblos raised but little last year.” Irrigation ditches were essential: 
without them the Pueblos had no way o f watering their fields. But Crandall found that 
Harper, over the last two years, had spent the bulk of his time at work at Zuni. He had
Shelton to CIA, 20 August 1904, #58517, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; CIA to Secretary o f  the 
Interior, 24 January 1905, Box 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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not inspected the other Pueblos since before the heavy rains of 1904, and thus was unable 
to see the gravity o f the situation.
Harper visited in April, but told Crandall that he could not get to the work until 
the end of the summer; there was too much to do on the Blackrock Dam. Of course, 
summer was the crucial planting and rainy season. If Harper neglected the Pueblos for 
another summer, the consequences would likely be harmful. Crandall was getting 
worried and wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that if the ditch was not rebuilt 
soon the “Pueblo Indians of San Ildefonso will be in a short time in the same condition 
that they were five years ago[when the ditch was first built]—destitute. Early in May, as 
Harper got work under way at Zuni, a massive flood came down the Rio Grande and 
finished off what was left of the San Ildefonso ditch. The flood washed away any hope of 
getting a crop in for the year. Oddly enough, as Crandall worried over the Indians at San 
Ildefonso, Harper was complaining again about Zuni and Navajo prosperity. The rain of 
the last two years, combined with the high price of wool, provided both with such good 
crops and abundant cash that they were too independent, again, to work on the dam. At 
San Ildefonso, where for centuries they had been able to farm on their own, the situation 
was dire. Now that the Indian Service had made promises to fix the ditches that they had 
built, the Indians came to rely on their assistance. But when help did not come, disaster 
ensued Dependence on Indian Service technical know-how seems to have lulled the San 
Ildefonsons into helplessness. The broken promises of the Indian Service regarding 
irrigation were largely due to Harper's neglect.**
C j  Crandall to CIA, 19 February 1906, #17912, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA. 
it is interesting to note that Crandall felt compelled to write the Commissioner; it indicates that he could 
not rely on Harper to concern himself with the other Pueblos. C.J. Crandall to CIA, 13 April 1906, #34064,
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At San Ildefonso the recent rains filled the Rio Pojoaque and irrigation from it 
was possible. But in the event of a dry season, the ditch on the Rio Grande would have to 
fixed. Harper warned that the Pojoaque did not run in dry years, and “when the 
inevitable dry cycle returns they must have water from the Rio Grande, or do without.” 
Of course, Crandall feared that Harper would not help and San Ildefonso would have no 
water. He worried that if immediate action were not taken San Ildefonso would shortly 
find itself without crops. However, Crandall realized the Government had spent a lot of 
money thus far on the ditch, some $7,000, and that anything they built now might not last 
long. Additionally, he noted that even if  they lost their crops, many of them worked 
anyway in beet fields and lumber camps, and “ten of them having been attached to a wild 
west show at Cony [sic] Island last sununer...brought home round about $1000.” Thus, 
the loss of their subsistence from agriculture was mollified by their entrance into the 
wage system.*’
One should not be tempted to blame this situation entirely on Harper’s neglect. 
Indeed, many Indians in the Southwest were involved in the wage economy. But I do 
want to suggest that there is a link between Harper’s preoccupation with the Blackrock 
Dam and the lack of development at San Ildefonso. In fact, San Ildefonso Pueblo would 
go without water development entirely. In 1908, H.F. Robinson, Superintendent of 
Irrigation and Harper’s replacement, recommended that no waterworks be built at San 
Ildefonso owing to the cost and the small population. By 1910, Robinson found that.
Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; John B. Harper to  W.H. Code, 4 May 1906, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; 
Harper to CIA, 7 May 1906, #41728, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to W.H. Code, 16 July 1906, 
GC, ID, Box I19 .R G 75 . N A
*’ C.J. Crandall to CIA, 31 December 1906, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA,
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The result [of my decision] has been that the San Ildefonso Indians have been 
without water for about five years excepting the flood water they secure from the 
Pojoaque River. They now are unable to raise much in the way of crops, and this year 
being very dry, what they did plant is rapidly drying up, although the rains which are Just 
beginning may save them. The entire male population of the Pueblo is away earning 
money to keep their families from starvation.
Robinson suggested spending $4,000 on a temporary ditch from the Rio Grande, 
otherwise, “the San Ildefonso Indians have practically no other hope of sustenance other 
than leaving their town and going to woiic.” With the hindsight of only a few years, 
Robinson saw the link between choosing to spend money in one place and not another. 
The work on the Zuni Dam was contributing to the underdevelopment of the other 
Pueblos.
The same was true on the Western Navajo reservation. Located on the periphery 
of official Navajo land, with its headquarters at Tuba City, this section of the reservation 
was routinely neglected by Harper. In fact, the Commissioner of the Indian Affairs was 
forced to intervene and urge the Irrigation Division to attend to matters in this remote 
section. Harper had had little time for the Navajo reservation. And by 1908, Stephan 
Janus, the Superintendent was fed up. He had repeatedly asked that reclamation work be 
done. By the summer of 1908, he bypassed the Irrigation Division and wrote directly to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and complained that a lot of money had been spent 
investigating the water supply but that no work had ever been done. The situation was 
dire. Lack of water was forcing the Navajos who lived out in this section of the 
reservation to encroach on Hopi land, and this would continue until reclamation work 
was done. But Janus’s calls went largely unheeded. The Irrigation Division did not have
“  H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 5 August 1910, GC, ID, B ox 112, RG 75, N A
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time to tend to the type of small projects— a dam across Moenkopi wash—that Janus 
wanted them to; the dam at Zuni was taking all of their time and resources. All he could 
manage was a small dam that washed out time and again.^’
If 1906 was a good year for the Zuni and the Navajo crops and wool, it was a bad 
one for John B. Harper and the Blackrock Dam. In December, Harper wrote, “We have 
had an abominable season since the first of April—either sand storms or floods most of 
the time.” Harper reported that the whole of the Southwest had been hard hit by storms 
over the past two years; he blamed regional flooding for the destruction of roads and 
railroad bridges and the formation of the Salton Sea, in California. Due to recent 
prosperity, the Zuni and Navajo were too independent and would not work on anything 
resembling a reliable schedule. Harper lamented that “the indirect results of the 
abnormal seasons have been fully as serious to us as the direct ones.” He found, again, 
that the pace of work on the dam proceeded as the weather and the Indians—^Navajo and 
Zuni both—allowed. When the dancing began at Zuni “what you will do is not what is 
necessary or what you want to do, but what you can. This thing of having your work 
depend on the whims of ignorant savages is not as pleasant as it might be.” Pleasant or 
not, the annual cycle that had been in place for ages prevailed over the imposed order
CIA to  H.F. Robinson, 30 March 1908, GC, ID, Box 109, RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to CIA, 9 July 
1908, GC, ID, Box 118; RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to W.H. Code, 4 August 1908, GC, ID, Box 118, RG 
75, NA; Stephen Janus to CIA, 30 September 1908; 4 November 1908, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; CIA to W H. 
Code, 24 November 1908, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to W.H Code, 12 January 1909, GC, ID, 
RG 75, NA; C.R. Olberg, Acting Chief Engineer, to Stephen Janus, 18 January 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; 
Stephen Janus to C.R. Olberg, 23 January 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to Stephen Janus, 4 
February 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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that Harper and the Irrigation Division tried to foist on both the environment and the 
Indians."'
When work commenced in April, 1907, Harper had to contend with a small labor 
force. By the middle of the summer work was up and running, but in August destructive 
flooding shut the project down for two weeks. And by September, the Zuni were in their 
fields harvesting com. Harper reported that the com was ripe early that year and thus the 
Zuni had no incentive to work. Additionally, he had come to realize that, indeed, each 
autumn, the Zuni left for their fields. The rest of the fall was a slow one. As was the 
custom each year, the Zuni abandoned work on the dam late in the season. In early 
December, Harper noted that “there are only twenty men at work today and tomorrow the 
Chalico [sic] dance begins and there will be a succession of dances firom this time until 
spring. For a few days we will have no men, and after that the prospect is very 
discouraging.” At the same time, workers from other Pueblos left to attend to their 
ceremonial schedules. And to top it all off. Harper, again, noted that the Indians in the 
region were too prosperous that year to want much work The recent rains were washing 
out ditches and dams and rendering the Navajo and Zuni too prosperous to want work. 
This two pronged assault on irrigation efforts insured slow progress.^^
At the San Juan Agency, the government built ditches were in a shambles. The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs hoped that Harper would be able to get to the Navajo 
Reservation, but the work at Blackrock kept him busy. By this time the agents working
“  John B. Harper to W.H. Code, 16 July 1906; John B Harper to W H. Code, 26 December 1906, GC, CD, 
B ox 119, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 24 January 1907, #11218, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
John B. Harper to W.H. Code, 7 September 1907; 4 October 1907; 4 December 1907, GC, ID, Box 119, 
RG 75, NA; Harper to C E Albing, acting C hief Engineer, 9 December 1907, GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, 
NA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
on the Navajo Reservation were upset; the areas that they oversaw had been neglected for 
too long. In 1907 the Indian Service sent a Special Agent, R.S. Connell, to inspect the 
work done thus far on the Navajo reservation and to see about the complaints of the 
Agents. He reported to the Commissioner on the sad state of affairs at the San Juan 
school.
Connell first noted that the San Juan school was foolishly located on the bottoms
of the San Juan river.
A western man who had seen the devilish freaks of such rivers as the Rio Puerco, 
Rio Grande, and the San Juan, would never have put a school on the bottoms, 
between the bluffs o f one of these rivers. At one time the channel is on one side 
of the bottom and the next time you see it in the middle, and perhaps another it 
will be across on the other side. It stays in one place just long enough to give a 
tender- foot time to get a nice home started where the river channel had once been 
and in time will be again.
Connell clearly recognized the capricious nature of the river, something that the 
Irrigation Division’s engineers failed to do. Connell found the status of the Indian farms 
along the river “deplorable.” The ditches built by the government’s “so called irrigation 
experts” were an utter failure, and “spoiled the ditches that the Indians had previously 
made.” Connell appeared to understand that the Navajo who farmed along the San Juan 
knew that the river shifted, and that is why, year after year, they built new ditches. Any 
attempt at permanency would have resulted in frustration and failure. Cormell’s report 
pointed out, again, the need to utilize captured information about the environment. And 
that could not be done by a stream of ever shifting agents who tried to control an ever 
shifting river.
R.S. Connell to CIA, 11 April 1907, GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA.
”  ibid
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Connell went further and said.
The Government irrigation experts not only ruined the Indian ditches, but no 
headgates were properly put in by these men and the river in freshets came 
through them with such force that it cut deep gullies in them and in some places 
the river changes its course and [cuts] a channel down the big government 
ditches. For miles down the river are scattered dead fruit tress and orchards, 
showing that these Indians were once prosperous and thrifty farmers. The Indians 
are very much discouraged from this and feel that the Government has not treated 
them fairly. They say that all o f their farms are ruined except two.^^
Years of bungling efforts on the San Juan left the Navajo without profitable 
farms; attempts to force them to settle permanently in places along the river were ill 
conceived and ill fated, and small scale diversion ditches were no match for the San 
Juan.
While Connell may have recognized that the Navajo were better suited than the 
Irrigation Division to planning waterworks on the San Juan in the past, his sights were set 
on the future. Had Connell arrived on the Navajo reservation in the 1880s he would have 
been well suited to the task; he knew that the Navajo understood the foolishness of 
attempting permanent structures. But he was of a different generation. Now was the 
time to attempt a permanent project. The Navajo had done an adequate job in the past, 
but they could not be expected to construct anything of permanence. Connell was, to be 
sure, sympathetic to the Navajo, but, like the rest of his generation, he believed in 
progress. It was time to abandon the old ways for modem ones. If the “theoretical 
experts...whose long suit is on paper’ could be shoved aside and a man “who builds 
irrigation works on the ground” be found, then a permanent way of tapping the riches of 
the San Juan would soon be at hand. Connell identified the area where the San Juan runs
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between high cliffs, the Hogback, as the ideal place to divert water through a tunnel and 
thus irrigate twenty thousand acres of fertile land. The river would not be able to change 
course as it ran between these cliffs, thus the problem would be solved. As the Irrigation 
Division made plans to channel water through the Hogback and thus control the San 
Juan, they also planned to control the Navajo. Water would follow a rigid trajectory and 
so would the Navajo. Connell wondered why the irrigation experts had not seen this spot 
before him; he answered his own question; “Because if  they would use nature, their work 
would not show up so well on paper.
In March, 1908 John B. Harper took ill and suddenly died. The dam proper at 
Zuni was finished early in the year. Only the ditches to supply water to Zuni fields 
needed to be completed. Harper had lived to see the dam become a reality, but not to see 
it in action. Before he died, however, he recommended holding off on the San Juan 
project. Ostensibly, he felt that the ditch could wait, but W.H. Code admitted to the 
Secretary of the Interior that, in fact. Harper had miscalculated and the Blackrock Dam 
had again gone over budget. Money needed to be diverted from the San Juan project and 
directed toward the Blackrock Dam. Code h c ^ d  that other projects on the Navajo and 
Hopi reservations, besides the one on the San Juan, would not suffer. Code allowed that 
Harper, in his zeal to see the Zuni dam completed, had neglected other projects. He 
acknowledged the cries from the Navajo and Hopi agents, and “hope[d] that there will be 
no further cause for complaint from that section.”'*
ibid
28
W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 17 March 1908, GC, ED, B ox 119, RG 75, NA.
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Throughout 1908, the work at Zuni and on the Hogback ditch remained relatively 
idle. No money, for the moment, was available to complete the Zuni dam, or to begin the 
Hogback project. In October, H.F. Robinson, Harper’s successor, estimated that the 
Blackrock Dam was going to cost an extra $40,000. At the same moment that Robinson 
reported to Code that the project at Zuni was far froni complete, a flood raged down the 
San Juan and washed out the ditch that Connell had so roundly criticized. And at the end 
o f the year the Secretary of the Interior wrote the Secretary of the Treasury and 
recommended that the extra money be spent on the Zuni Dam; otherwise what had been 
spent thus far would be wasted. Thus, the Hogback project was put on hold for a little 
while longer, the Navajo farms along the San Juan stood in disrepair and not a single acre 
was irrigated under the Zuni irrigation project. The Irrigation Division’s plans were not 
going as planned.^^
Code and Robinson started to notice, soon after Harper’s death, that work on 
projects other than Zuni had suffered. Both men admitted that Harper spent too much 
time on the Blackrock Dam, and had not allocated sufficient funds or personnel to the 
other reservations. Robinson accused “Mr. Harper [of] putting his entire time and 
attention to the Zuni dam, [and] all of the other work has been badly neglected for the 
last three or four years.” What’s more, neither Code nor Robinson seemed to have 
noticed this before. Code urged Robinson to push work ahead on other projects, with the 
exception of the Hogback, so that the $30,000 left in the fund would not be returned to 
the treasury in July, the end of the fiscal year. Code also warned Robinson that “the 
Indian Irrigation cannot go on in the old free way, where the engineers seemed to be
H F  Robinson to W.H. Code, 12 October 1908, GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, NA; Secretary o f  the Interior
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responsible to neither man or god.” The implication was, o f course, that they had been 
answering to no one, that money was spent at the whim of the engineer. To be sure. 
Harper had been answering to no one; he spent the money he was allocated as he saw fit. 
Thus, problems with the institutional structure of the Irrigation Division helped along the 
neglect at sites other than Zuni. To prevent circumstances like this the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs instituted a system o f quarterly financial reports designed to keep better 
tabs on the notoriously profligate Irrigation Division.
Code and Robinson were now in a rush to prioritize; they had to “decide on the 
relative values” of the various projects. Indeed, Code was loathe to proceed with large- 
scale projects on the Navajo reservation. He thought it wise to wait and see how 
successful the Zuni dam was before taking on any other major waterworks. Code was 
beginning to question the feasibility of reclaiming Indian land on the Colorado Plateau. 
After finally realizing that Harper had siphoned off almost all the funds each year for the 
benefit of the Zuni dam, it was apparent why little had been accomplished on the Navajo 
reservation. Because of the overspending on the Blackrock dam, little money was left 
for other projects and Code confided to Robinson that the “gigantic San Juan 
scheme...looks like a pipe dream,” and wondered could $10,000 to $12,000 more be
to the Secretary o f  the Treasury, 24 December 1908, GC, ED, B ox 119, RG 75, NA.
W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 27 November 1908, GC, ED, B ox 109, RG 75, NA; H F 
Robinson to  W.H. Code, 2 April 1908; 20 May 1908, GC, ID, Box 103, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to 
Robinson, 7 April 1908, GC, ID, Box 103, RG 75, NA; Code to Robinson, 10 July 1908, GC, ID. Box 103 
RG 75, NA. Because o f  space limitations 1 am only discussing the Hogback project, but Harper’s neglect 
was also felt at Fort Defiance and on the western edge o f  the reservation at Tuba. For information on the 
other projects on the reservation see Samuel S. Shoemaker, Supervisor o f  Constructed Ditches and Special 
Dispersing Agent to CIA, 30 May 1904, SC 190, B ox 210, RG 75, NA. This nine page report gives a basic 
outline o f  the progress being made on other projects on the reservation. See also, George Butler, General 
Superintendent o f  Irrigation to CIA, 24 June 1906, SC 190, Box 210, RG 75, NA. Butler’s nineteen page 
report is full o f  detail regarding irrigation across the entire reservation.
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diverted to the Zuni Dam. After all. Code said, “these Indians [the Navajo] are good
herdsmen, and can always obtain a good living from their s h e e p . R o b i n s o n  agreed.
I fully concur in your views that the [Navajo and Hopi] Indians are herdsmen and 
not farmers. It is shown that they are many of them anxious to have a chance to 
put a little com ect. but none of them will put in more that they need for their own 
immediate uses. Their flocks are more valuable than their crops, and to find 
grazing they must of necessity be nOmadic. Stock water is of greater necessity 
than irrigation water. A large amount of money has been spent for the latter, and 
the net results are infentesimal [sic] as yet.^^
The consequences of Code’s and Robinson’s conclusions are difficult to gauge. 
Over the next several years the little major work was done on the Navajo Reservation; 
most energy was thrown into surveying underground sources of water for stock raising. 
Herbert Gregory, a geologist for the U.S. Geological Survey on loan to the Irrigation 
Division to help out with underground water surveys, helped Code and Robinson come to 
this conclusion. In his estimation, Navajo country was not suited to farming; the 
Navajos’ land should be developed for stock raising. And his opinion held sway with the 
Indian Service. Thus when he recommended “that the region be developed for stock, 
especially sheep; that no large irrigation enterprises designed for agriculture be 
undertaken,” the Indian Service was disposed to listen.
The Hogback ditch, however, would be constructed. Cries from W.T. Shelton 
throughout 1909 finally pricked up the ears of the Irrigation Division. Shelton’s earlier 
aversion to the Irrigation Division gave way after the flooding in the fall of 1908. It was 
now time for a major project on the San Juan; temporary structures failed too often.
"  H.F. Robinson to W H. Code, 20 May 1908, GC, ID, Box 103, RG 75, NA; W H Code to H.F 
Robinson, 6 November 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA.
H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 10 November 1908, GC, ID, Box 103, RG 75, NA.
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Code was tired of being criticized for the Division’s efforts on the San Juan. “The 
Engineers of the Indian Service have already come in for a great deal of criticism due to 
the failure of the ditches heretofore constructed [on the San Juan], and any work that we 
do there now should be built so that it would stay.” Robinson hoped the money allocated 
for the Pueblos could be sacrificed in favor of the Hogback project, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affaire and Code agreed, and the project was approved.
Of course, there were immediate problems. Within a couple of months after 
construction began Robinson observed that the San Juan river was at its highest stage in 
fifteen years and wondered would the present plans be sufficient to control the river. In 
September floods raged down the San Juan and devastated the project. Plans had to be 
altered month by month as contingencies no one had planned for kept popping up. By 
the following summer Robinson estinjated that the project would cost $134,371.45.^^
Not coincidentally, the same week in early September that flooding visited the 
San Juan, severe flooding also filled the Zuni river. The Blackrock Dam, after initially 
hopeful reports to the contrary, was badly damaged. W.H. Code estimated that $125,000
Herbert E. Gregory “Water Resources o f  the Navajo-Moki Reservation,” NARA, GC, ID, B ox 110.
There is no definite date on Gregory’s eighty-four page report, but it was filed with letters from 1909-1910.
W.T. Shelton to C IA  22 January 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; W.T. Shelton to H F Robinson, 22 
January 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; J.T. Quinton, asst, engineer, to W.H. Code, 31 March 1909, 
GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to H.F. Robinson, 7 April 1909, GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA; 
H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 23 April 1909, GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to H F Robinson,
7 May 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA.
”  H F Robinson to  W.H. Code, 8 July 1909; 24 September 1909, GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA; J.M 
Martin, asst, engneer to  Code, 10 November 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; Robinson to Code, 21 
January 1910; 20 July 1910, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; for the flooding on the San Juan see W.B. 
Freeman and R.H. Bolster, Surface Water o f  the United States, Part fX, Colorado River Basin, 1909, Water 
Supply Paper 269, Washington: GPO, 1911, 187-190.
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would be needed to salvage the project. By the end of the 1909, five years after 
construction began on the dam, no land was irrigated.
But the Irrigation Division would not take responsibility for the damage done to 
the dam. They blamed it on nature. The reasoning went like this: If problems of this sort 
could have been predicted maybe then the dam would not have been attempted; to 
protect a dam from the sort of flooding that was now reducing it to rubble might have 
made it prohibitively expensive. What the Irrigation Division was saying was that if they 
knew it would have been such a disaster they would not have tried in the first place. It is 
this sort of logic that is so instructive. If the Indian Service had really thought about and 
planned the projects they attempted, something they seem assiduously to have avoided, 
then they may have realized the folly of their efforts. If they had initially factored in 
contingencies such as massive floods, then they might not have gone ahead with the 
project. As late as 1910, adequate stream flow records for the Zuni River did not exist, 
making work, at this late date in the enterprise, still smack of guesswork.
The flooding that devastated both the Zuni dam and the Hogback ditch had a 
sobering affect on W.H. Code. In the summer of 1910, with the Blackrock dam still in 
disrepair, he wrote to the Secretary of the Interior looking for more money, but, above 
all, for sympathy. If he had known that the project was going to cost so much, with so 
little to show, he would never have built it; but, in the meantime, more money was
“  H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 7 September 1909 (telegram), GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, NA,; W.B. Hill, 
asst, engineer to Code, 13 September 1909 (telegram), GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, NA; Rollin Ritter, asst, 
supt. o f  irrigation to Code, 13 September 1909, GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, NA; W.B. Hill and W.H. 
Saunders, asst, engineers to Code, 16 October 1909, GC, ID, Box 119, RG 75, NA; Code to the Secretary 
o f  the Interior, 29 October 1909, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; for the flooding on the Zuni see H. F. 
Robinson, Flood on the Zuni River, Arizona, September 6, 1909, Water Supply Paper 269, 206-210; on the 
lack o f  stream flow data see J.M. Martin, acting Chief Engineer, to W.H. Code, 28 March 1910, Box 120, 
GC, ID, RG 75, NA
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necessary in order that the funds already spent would not go to waste. Code’s primary 
concern had become protecting the Indian Bureau’s $300,000 investment. Code still did 
not address the lack o f planning and the ignorance of the Irrigation Division. Code could 
be humble, but never did he try to ascribe blame to anything or anyone but the forces of 
nature or Indian intransigence. By this time, it was clear that he was in despair. He had 
signed off on all of Harper’s requests for money and more time, rarely questioning his 
work. Now, he was afraid it was all for naught.
Flooding revisited the San Juan River in the fall of 1910 and 1911, further 
curtailing work on the Hogback project. Robinson claimed that the flooding of 1910 was 
worse than the previous year. But the flooding of 1911, in Robinson’s estimation, beat 
both years. The damage to the ditch was so severe that engineers were pulled off projects 
elsewhere In the West to assist with inspecting the destruction. Code seemed ready to 
give up when he wondered “if a maximum high water mark can ever be determined 
upon” for the San Juan river. Part of the problem, again, was ignorance concerning local 
conditions.^*
Throughout 1912, both projects experienced further problems. The Blackrock 
Dam was operating in a limited fashion by the summer of 1911, but promptly after it 
started to be put to use, siltation on a grand scale became a problem. The reservoir was 
so quickly filling with silt that it was being rendered useless. Again, this appears to be a
”  W H  Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, ? June 1910, GC, ID, B ox 120, RG 75, NA; for further 
evidence o f  the need to  take money away from other projects see W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the 
Interior, 29 October 1909, Box 119, GC, ED, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to CIA, 18 April 1911, Box 120, GC, 
ID, RG 75, NA.
H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 9 October 1909; 26 October 1909; 27 October 1909, GC. ID, Box 106,
RG 75, NA; Extract from Report o f  Edward G. Gerbsbach, Superintendent o f  construction in charge o f  the 
work at the Hogback Canal,” 9 October 1909, GC. ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; Code to Hill, 28 October
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contingency that Code had not considered. After realizing that the reservoir was so soon 
filling with silt, he warned that this would be a problem all over the Southwest. That this 
would come as a surprise to the chief engineer is odd indeed. But from Code’s 
correspondence and tone, it seems as if the sediment carried by streams in the Southwest, 
or anywhere for that matter, had not previously been considered as a limiting factor in 
storing water. In the 1880s or 90s, as the Indian Service began its reclamation efforts, 
this kind of oversight was expected, but not seven years into a major project. At the 
Hogback ditch, flooding once again wreaked havoc, this time in the spring of the year. 
For the Hogback, 1912 was a bad year. No further construction was attempted; the whole 
year was spent repairing the damage done over the previous year! Additionally, W.T. 
Shelton reported trouble rounding up a labor force; the Navajo were out lambing and 
planting, as they were that time every year. Eventually he employed his reservation 
police force to coerce Navajos into working on the ditch, albeit with little success. These 
two projects, both so costly, were bearing little fruit.
Heavy rains and flooding continued over the next few years. In 1914, for 
example, Robinson reported that the usual summer storms began to fall in May rather
1909 (telegram). Box 106, GC, ED, RG 75, NA; Code to Robinson, 28 October 1909, Box 106GC, ED,,
RG 75. NA.
On siltation o f  the reservoir see Rollin Ritter to  W.H. Code, 22 June 1910, B ox  120, GC, ED, RG 75, NA; 
H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 2 July 1910, B ox 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W.H. Sanders, engineer, to W.H. 
Code, 3 October 1910, Box 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 18 
October 191Q; 5 January 1911, GC, ID, RG 75, NA. The siltation o f  the reservoir became a huge problem 
in later years, but is out o f  the scope o f  this thesis and is covered in detail elsewhere, see T J Ferguson, “The 
Impact o f  Federal Policy on Zuni Land U se” in Seasons o f the Kachina: Proceedings o f the California 
State, Hayward, Conference on the Western Pueblos, 1987-88, edited by Lowell John Bean (M enlo Park, 
CA Ballena Press, 1989), 103; Thomas Wessel, “Phantom Experiment Station; Government Agriculture on 
the Zuni Indian Reservation,” Agricultural History 61(1987) 1-12; for the Hogback see Salter, asst, 
engineer to  J.J. Granville, engineer, 27 March 1912 (telegram), GC, ID, Box 106, RG 75, NA; Hauke, 2nd. 
asst. CIA to Granville, 27 March 1912 (telegram). Box 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Granville to CIA, 28 
March 1912 (telegram). B ox 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Hauke to Granville, 1 April 1912, B ox 106, GC, ID,
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than July, “and our work has suffered considerable damage in consequence.” He claimed 
that July, 1914 was the wettest July New Mexico had ever seen.**®
Work on the Hogback ditch slogged away year after year, but it would never 
reclaim the 35,000 acres that John Wesley Powell had hoped for, or even the 20,000 
acres that R.S. Connell claimed. And the siltation of the reservoir at Zuni rendered the 
Blackrock Dam almost useless.
These two projects never lived up to the expectations of the Irrigation Division. 
Lack of planning, Zuni and Navajo cultural obligations, and a capricious environment all 
conspired to make unworkable the Indian Service’s agricultural utopia. As America 
became more industrialized, the Indian Service was still entranced by the agrarian myth. 
Indians, like the rest of America, could be made whole citizens by learning the value of 
tilling one’s own soil. Richard Hofstadter once said that “the agrarian myth came to be 
believed more widely and tenaciously as it became more fictitious.” This was indeed 
true for the Indian Service. As farmers’ status began to decrease in the American 
economy and image, the Indian Service tried, in an almost backwards move, to create a 
new class of farmers. The Indian Service believed in a vast fiction in the Southwest: 
Indians were not capable of farming on their own, and it was the Indian Service, bom out 
of an agrarian empire, that could make them realize the fhiits of civilization. Not only 
did the Indian Service buy the myth, but it tried to indoctrinate Indians. In the end, the 
reverse was true. Myths about docile Indians, misperceptions of the environment, and a
RG  75, NA; H.F. Robinson to CIA, 22 May 1912, Box 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Annual Reports o f  the 
Chief Engineer, 1912, p. 127, Box 1, Series 654, ID, RG 75, NA.
“ H.F. Robinson to W M. Reed. Chief Engineer, 17 July 1914; 25 July 1914, Box 104, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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blind faith in the power of agriculture to civilize the Navajos and Zunis dashed
waterworks projects on the Colorado Plateau 41
Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f  Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (N ew  York: Vintage Books, 1955), 30.
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Conclusion
Indians and the environment are frequently represented in the literature as 
defeated entities. The histories of both often have predictable plot lines and endings: 
before the white man came all was well; after contact both were crippled and eventually 
defeated. When Indians and the environment are written about together, they are 
portrayed as innocent victims o f viiite cupidity, stupidity, and, often, malice. 
Alternately, Indians are often thought of as inextricable from nature. This is too simple a 
tale.*
The Government did not always run rampant over nature or Indians, rendering 
them both defenseless and defeated. On the contrary, history is far more complex than 
that, and the Blackrock dam and the Hogback ditch demonstrate cases where the Indian 
Service misunderstood both nature and Indians, with costly results. In these two cases, 
the forces of the natural world and the exigencies o f the Navajo and Zuni cultures kept 
these projects from being successful. Resistance to the efforts of the Irrigation Division 
did not come from either the environment or the Indians in a calculated fashion. Rather, 
as the waterworks projects got under way the forces of nature and the strength of 
centuries of accumulated cultural vigor kicked in and made work difficult, if not 
impossible. Again, the notion of agency comes into play. Indians on the Colorado 
Plateau exercised agency not so much as a contemplated response to changing
‘ William Cronon, “A  Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” Journal o f  American History 
78(1992): 1347-1376; Cronon describes what I am talking about as a declensionist narrative, one in which 
the “plot ultimately falls rather than rises,” and the outcome is decidedly negative, 1357; for writing Indian 
environmental history see Richard White, “Indian Peoples and the Natural World: Asking the Right
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conditions, but merely as all people do; they carried on with day to day activities that 
provide the structure for history and social change. W.H. Code summed up very nicely 
this idea when he realized that “their dances offer charms at all times not found in the 
monotonous round of daily toil.” In this case, Zuni agency merely meant that they chose 
to dance, when they could have chosen to do otherwise. Carrying on with the prescribed 
ritual cycle of the year was not only charming, it was essential. And Code was right: 
working on a dam could not be nearly as satisfying, meaningful or, indeed, as fun as 
dancing. Thus, the Zuni choice to dance and not work was a utilization of their agency, 
but it fit into the structure of everyday life. The environment, too, merely carried on as it 
always had. It was only when the Indian Service attempted to alter previous ways of 
knowing nature that a clash occurred and we see Indian and environmental agency as 
resistance.^
It might be tempting to look for calculated responses of resistance to the Indian 
Service’s efforts. And if  the search revealed a concerted effort to resist, then more 
research would be necessary to explore the motivations and shape of that response. For 
the time being, however, carrying on with the annual cycle that had developed separately 
from Indian Service efforts was the only evident response. The character of the 
responses, both from nature and from the Zunis and Navajos, to the Indian Service’s 
reclamation efforts has shaped this thesis.
Questions,'’ in Rethinking American Indian History, Donald Fixico, ed. {Albuquerque: Univ. o f  N ew  
M exico Press, 1997), 87-100.
 ̂W.H. Code to the Secretary o f  the Interior, 12 December 1905, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
There is evidence that could be fleshed out with further research that might support the hypothesis that the 
Zuni did resist in a more calculated manner. Over the years o f  Matilda Coxe Stevenson’s ethnological 
research, 1880-1915, she noticed that rituals got longer and came more frequently; she also reported new 
rituals. There is no sure way o f  knowing whether this is related to the dam building, but the coincidence in 
timing is suggestive. On agency, see note 14 in the introduction.
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Reluctance to embrace wage labor over domestic, subsistence labor is common 
phenomena among precapitalist peoples. Michael Taussig describes this phenomena as a 
clash between use-value and exchange-value modes of production. Making money as a 
worker on a dam and then being able to spend it on “things"—exchange value—holds far 
less meaning than' planting com to eat and honor as the stuff of life—use-value. 
Adherence to traditional use-value production rather than leaping into the wage economy 
always baffled the Indian Service. That is, why would Navajos continue to repair a small 
dam year after year when they returned from the mountains with their sheep when it was 
time to plant, if they could have a permanent dam that would supply water year round? 
John B. Harper was vexed perpetually by the Zuni when they would abandon work each 
winter to participate in Shalako. If the dam was built, adherence to ritual would no 
longer be necessary. The dam would replace ritual as the ordering agent in Zuni life. 
Rather than praying to the gods, one only had to keep the spillway clean. But agents and 
water planners who had been in the country only a short time could not expect simply to 
reshape forces that had been ordering life for centuries, or longer.^
More than simple reluctance to engage in a wage economy that was circling 
around them like a flock of vultures, waiting for the old ways to wither away, was the 
Zuni and Navajos immersion in a mode of production that did not embrace 
overproduction. Their economic orientation was not for the market; it was for use-value, 
not exchange-value. To be sure, by the 1890s the Navajo sold wool and blankets in 
exchange for cash; and some Navajos and Zuni left the reservation for wage work. But 
reorienting agriculture to produce for a market and abandon ritual in favor of ordered
Michael Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America (Chapel Hill; Univ. o f  North
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water flow from a dam or ditch was another matter. The Indian Service was not able to 
manage water in the way they intended, and thus was unable to manage Indian life."̂
By the end of the period in question, contemporaneous reaction indicates that the 
Irrigation Division was doing more harm than good. They had wasted precious resources 
and had little to show for it. Indians may or may not have learned the value of work in 
the white world; that’s difficult to quantify. But it is certain that the reclamation efforts 
of the Irrigation Division were a failure. In 1913, Matthew M. Murphy, a long time, but 
disgruntled, employee of the Indian Service, spoke his mind in a letter and memorandum 
to Arizona Senator Heniy F. Ashurst. The target of Murphy’s vitriol was the Irrigation 
Division, in particular the Blackrock dam on the Zuni Reservation. After witnessing 
years of destructive flooding continually washing out the project, and costs escalating 
year after year while production went down, Murphy attacked this white elephant with 
aplomb. His assault on the Indian Service strikes the reader as nothing short of apostasy. 
He pulled out of his quiver a battery o f  charges that in their perspicuity and candor reveal 
a project that was doomed from the start. Murphy’s insights into the reasons for the 
failure of the project reveal, for the contemporary environmental historian, issues that 
plagued not only the Zuni project, but others in the Southwest. Murphy wanted to launch 
a full investigation of the Irrigation Division, with himself at the helm. He was so sure 
that he would expose their wasteful ways that if he did not, he would resign from the 
Indian Service in "disgrace
Carolina Press, 1980), 18-22.
“* Marshall Sahlins, The Domestic Mode o f  Production; The Structure o f  Underproduction,” in Stoite Age 
£co/wot/c5: (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).
 ̂Matthew Murphy to Senator Henry F. Ashurst, 8 May 1913; 16 May 1913, Box 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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Murphy’s sympathies clearly fall on the side of the Indians. Murphy contends 
that at the time the dam was authorized, the Zuni were prosperous and seemed to have a 
command of the environment. Why, then, did a dam seem imperative? The Indian 
Service, of course, did not ask them if they wanted the dam and Murphy avers that the 
Zuni never displayed a shred of interest in the project. Additionally, Murphy touches 
upon the flooding that wreaked havoc on the dam. He wondered; Why, if the dam was 
supposed to hold back floodwaters from spring run-off and summer downpours, the only 
type of water that normally flowed th ro u ^  the streambed, did the engineers building the 
dam not have an adequate understanding of the power of Southwestern freshets? 
According to Murphy, and I think that the record bears out his claim, the Indian Service 
began work on the dam really having no idea what they were up against. That 
floodwaters were to fill the reservoir behind the dam did not alert them to the possibility 
that those same waters might be destructive, not productive. After a systematic reading 
of the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Murphy contended that in 
direct relation to worsening conditions at Zuni—continued flooding, siltation, and Indian 
disinterest—the Commissioner’s discussion of the project went down. It appeared that 
the Zuni dam was becoming an embarrassment. When the project was going well, the 
Annual Reports had lengthy, glowing, detailed descriptions of the success of the dam; as 
costs escalated, with little land under cultivation, the reports on the dam became virtual 
footnotes.
To Murphy, the Blackrock dam was a colossal waste o f  money. It was a project 
that the Indians did not want and did not need. While Murphy’s comments may be those 
of a disenchanted government employee, they do have value. With very little hindsight.
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he picked up on several of the large themes that I have addressed. Most importantly, he 
understood the related issues surrounding the Indian Service’s refusal to consult the 
Zunis which, in turn, ignored centuries of captured information regarding wresting a 
living from the Colorado Plateau and led the Irrigation Division to attempt a project in an 
environment that they barely understood. Too, Murphy grasped that the Blackrock dam, 
year after year, took precedence over other projects and was the bulk of the Irrigation 
Division’s budget which meant that the Irrigation Division shunted aside other projects. 
Murphy seemed to think that, as do I, that the Irrigation Division’s fatal mistake was its 
arrogant ignorance of Indians and the environment.^
But, of course, Murphy’s criticism did not go unanswered. W.M, Reed, 
superintendent of irrigation, responded with equal vigor to Murphy’s critique. His 
arguments were sound, too. He claimed that conditions in the Southwest were changing 
so rapidly—increases in population, prime grazing lands falling into private hands—that 
the Indian Service was honor-bound to see to it that the Navajos and Zunis had adequate 
land from which to make a living. Indians did not realize that conditions were fast 
changing and that their lifeways would soon be obsolete. “Left alone, unaided and 
uninstructed he would not have foreseen the approach of such conditions and would have 
realized them only when he found himself facing starvation.” Indian Service prescience 
would save the Navajos and Zunis. ̂
U b id
 ̂W.M. Reed, “Memorandum on Matthew Murphy’s discourse on Commissioner’s and others’ 
mismanagement o f  Zuni Indian aflfairs,” 26 April 1913, Box 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA. That Reed’s memo is 
dated several weeks before Murphy’s letter is not a discrepancy. Murphy’s report on the dam was written 
before Reed s response; I am simply using a copy o f  his report attached to his letter to Ashurst, which was 
sent after Reed’s response.
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Indeed, conditions were changing and few of the new settlers in the Southwest 
had much concern for the fate of the Indians, especially Navajos wandering about with 
their flocks. Reed was right, to a point, in saying that the Indian Service had the interests 
of the Zunis and Navajos in mind, but he did not address the mistakes made on the dam. 
He allowed that John Harper was too optimistic concerning how long it would take the 
dam to be finished and how much it would cost. But he was disposed to put down the 
failure of the dam in 1909 to nature and not Irrigation Division mistakes.
Reed was reluctant to accede to any of Murphy’s criticisms. Had he done so he 
would have been indicting the agency he oversaw. While Murphy’s report reveals some 
of the broad contours of the problem, Reed’s response highlights one crucial problem: 
Irrigation Division refusal to see their own complicity in the failures of the dam. 
Throughout the period, the Indian Service, and later the Irrigation Division specifically, 
always found fault with the Indians or with the environment. Maybe this is not too 
surprising. But when held up against Zuni and Navajo participation in this story, the 
Indian Service comes off as having no say. Indeed, they position themselves in the story 
as merely being at the whims of the Navajos, Zunis, and the environment. I originally set 
out to show that the combined strength of the Zunis, Navajos, and nature guided 
waterworks efforts on the Colorado Plateau between 1883 and 1914. 1 was confident that 
this premise was a plausible one. It seems, however, that the engineers and bureaucrats 
of the Indian Service and Irrigation Division had done a far finer job of proving that 
themselves.
The stoiy has no absolute closure; it is merely a part of a larger, more intricate 
narrative. But by taking a magnifying glass to a discrete portion of Indian history in the
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Southwest, I hope to have fleshed out some of the complexity of Indian environmental 
history. Judging exactly what types of social change occurred among the Zuni and 
Navajo demands a longer-term analysis and a different lens through which to view the 
history. My modest goal has been to show that the Zuni and Navajo, and, of course, the 
environment, played a very active role in determining what type of social change did 
occur. The Indian Service was, to be sure, a vehicle for that change. But, and even often 
by their own admission, they directed the history less than the supposedly passive vessels 
o f their wisdom: the Navajos and Zunis, and the natural world of the Southwest.
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